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The foreign policies of the Fifth Republic: A study in presidential styles

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THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC

A Study in Presidential Styles

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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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To my father, Charles Morgan Lane.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to compare the presidential styles of the three leaders of France's Fifth Republic within the realm of foreign policy.

A framework of analysis was devised to compare the performance of De Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard in office. Each man is analyzed in terms of the experiences and conditions that molded his world view; the support and opposition that he encountered in carrying out his programs; the goals that he hoped to achieve and the image that he projected to the world. This study deals as much with personalities as with issues. Only three issues are considered in depth: the Common Market (EEC), NATO, and East-West relations.

It is suggested that the institutiónal arrangement of the Fifth Republic provides France's president a unique opportunity to leave his personal imprint on French foreign policy.

This comparison demonstrates that there are more substantive differences among the three presidents than might be apparent to the casual observer. The most obvious differences are in style, especially when one compares de Gaulle and Giscard. Each president appears to have made a conscious effort to distinguish himself from his predecessors in matters of style.

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC

A Study in Presidential Styles

INTRODUCTION

The three presidents of France's Fifth Republic have displayed unique and sometimes divergent styles in the conduct of foreign affairs. From June 1958 through April 1969, Charles de Gaulle alone formulated French foreign policy.[1] His was a very personal style. France's international posture was an extension of the General's personality and prejudices. The foreign policies of Georges Pompidou reflected the the Gaullist heritage with the notable exception of Britain's admission to the Common Market in 1972. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who became the Fifth Republic's first non-Gaullist president in May 1974, has differed from his predecessors in matters of style and of substance. Under Giscard, France has become less vehemently anti-NATO and less stridently anti-American. The French leader has demonstrated his ability to work amicably with London and Washington. Relations between France and its neighbors have changed considerably since 1958. The purpose of this study is to examine the evolution of French foreign policy during the past two decades and to compare the presidential styles of de Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard.

The constitution of the Fifth Republic assigns primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs to the executive. Through a liberal interpretation of Article Five, de Gaulle accorded himself virtual autonomy in foreign relations. Article Five defines the president as "the guarantor of national independence, of the integrity of the territory, and of respect for Community agreements and treaties."[2] Article Twenty-one delegates responsibility for national defense to the prime minister. De Gaulle ignored this separation of powers and established foreign policy and national defense as his private domains. The General believed that the only solution to France's foreign policy problems was a strong executive. He articulated this conviction on June 16, 1946, in his now-famous Bayeux speech.

> It would be the duty of the Chief of State to reconcile, in the choice of men, the general interest with the orientation that emerges from the Parliament; it would be his mission to nominate the ministers and, of course, firstly the premier who is to direct the policy and the work of the Government; it would be the function of the Chief of State to promulgate the Laws and to issue the decrees, for it is toward the State as a whole that citizens are obligated by them; he would have the task of presiding over the cabinet meetings and exercising there the influence of continuity without with a nation cannot survive; he would serve as arbiter above political contingencies, either normally through the Council, or, in moments of grave confusion, by inviting the country to make known its sovereign decisions through elections; he would have, if it were to happen that the nation were in peril, the duty to safeguard national independence and the treaties concluded by France.[3]

Between 1946 and 1958, the twenty-three cabinets of the Fourth Republic had grappled with overseas policy.[4] Crises in Indochina, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria had contributed to the demise of several governments and had helped to topple successive cabinets. In de Gaulle's view, lack of consensus within the parliament was largely responsible for France's poor record in foreign affairs. He considered the parliament a morass, characterized by numerous parties and conflicting interests, and in itself a primary cause of France's overseas predicament. "In brief," he noted at Bayeux, "the rivalry of parties is in our country a fundamental characteristic, always questioning everything and before which, too often, the higher interests of the country are obscured."[5]

When he received an electoral mandate as president of the fledgling Fifth Republic in January 1959, de Gaulle insisted upon taking foreign policy into his own hands. Foreign policy was designed in the Elysée Palace and presented to the National Assembly as an accomplished fact.

Critics have noted that the General was uncertain how to resolve the Algerian crisis when he assumed office. This criticism is substantiated by de Gaulle's erratic behavior toward Algeria. One author has described de Gaulle as a master of the equivocal statement.[6] When he announced "I have understood you" to the demands of French Algerians in the Forum of Algiers on June 4, 1958, he was expressing an appreciation of their situation rather than agreement with their views. The General vacillated between a military solution in Algeria and the granting of total independence. He

came under pressure from such sources as the United Nations, Algeria's National Liberation Front (FLN), Algerian-born Frenchmen (pieds-noirs), and his own generals. Though his solution did not placate all of these elements, metropolitan France approved it in a popular referendum. De Gaulle deserves most of the credit for this achievement.

The General's solution to the Algerian problem established a precedent in French foreign policy. Not since Pierre Mendes-France staked his reputation on an acceptable conclusion to the Indochina conflict in July 1954 had a French leader resolved an overseas crisis. De Gaulle was to continue this style in his treatment of the NATO alliance, and in his relations with the United States, Great Britain, and French Quebec. His rallying cry of "Long live free Quebec!" during a state visit to Canada on July 25, 1967, shocked his hosts. His insistence on the development of an independent nuclear strike force also frustrated his Western allies. The French leader was reluctant to depend on the American nuclear umbrella in the event of a Soviet invasion of West Germany. He did not believe that the United States would commit its nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union and sought to develop an independent French arsenal. Since an effective deterrent is designed to prevent a war rather than win one, Western analysts have questioned that deterrent value of the French nuclear capability. Henry A. Kissinger wrote in 1969 that "deterrence--the policy of preventing an action by confronting the opponent with risks he is unwilling to run--depends in the first

instance on psychological criteria. What the potential aggressor believes is more crucial than what is objectively true. Deterrence occurs above all in the minds of men."[7] Nevertheless, de Gaulle perservered, and to this day France steers an independent nuclear course.

Sometimes de Gaulle's policies seemed contradictory. He originally opposed decolonication in Algeria; four years later he granted independence to Algeria. Though he accepte regional integration through such organizations as the European Economic Community, he opposed Britain's entry to the Common Market and refused to allow the French military to participate actively in NATO. Though he held open referenda on his policies of Algerian self-determination and independence, he summarily withdrew French forces from NATO in 1966 after perfunctory consultations with only three cabinet members. Despite these contradictions, he solved the colonial problem, stabilized the government, aided modernization, and did much to enhance his nation's status as a world power.

It was a standard joke within the legislature of the Fourth Republic that parliament formulated foreign policy, the executive approved it, and no one implemented it. De Gaulle proved this cliché wrong. In the Fifth Republic, the president formulated, approved, and implemented foreign policy.

De Gaulle believed that his authority derived from his credentials and from his special relationship with the French people. On January 29, 1960, he launched the following

appeal: "By virtue of the mandate that the people have given me and of the national legitimacy that I have embodied for twenty years, I ask all men and women to support me, no matter what happens."[8] On January 6, 1961, he returned to this theme in an address about Algerian independence. "For more than twenty years, events have willed that I serve as the guide of the country during the grave crisis we have lived through ... But also, I need--yes, I need--to know what is in your hearts and minds. That is why I am turning to you, by-passing all intermediaries. In truth--who is not aware of it--the matter is between each woman and man of France and myself."[9]

In June 1940, de Gaulle established a Free French movement in London after the collapse of the Third Republic. Throughout the war he considered himself and his group the true government of France and denounced the Vichy regime as a Nazi puppet. Directives issued by his office during the war often began, "We, Charles de Gaulle ..." Even during his absence from the political scene between 1946 and 1958 he believed himself the embodiment of "The Eternal France," which he describes so eloquently in the opening pages of his War Memoirs.[10]

Though not inclined to view themselves as the product of a great historical tradition, de Gaulle's successors have reflected his belief in a powerful presidency. Like de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou was a strong leader. After his election in June 1969, Pompidou consolidated Gaullist strength.

The vital areas of foreign policy and defense remained within the jurisdiction of the president. Pompidou announced policy decisions without allowing debate either in the National Assembly or among his own ministers. He advocated a powerful France that would remain independent of NATO, the United States, and the Soviet Union. In a deviation from the Gaullist path, Pompidou invited British Prime Minister Edward Heath to Paris for talks which resulted in Britain's admission to the EEC. Except for the issue of the Common Market, Pompidou's foreign policy was quite similar to de Gaulle's.

If de Gaulle and Pompidou appear to have been cast from the same political mold, such is not the case with Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. As minister of finance under de Gaulle, Giscard criticized the General's solitary exercise of power, the authoritarian style of his regime, and his insufficient commitment to European solidarity. After his victory in the presidential election of 1965 by a mere 54 percent of the second ballot, de Gaulle dismissed Giscard from his government. The General blamed his performance at the polls partly on Giscard's conservative economic policies, and cited the young man's "ambivalent attitude toward the government" as reason for his dismissal.[11]

The platform of Giscard's Independent Republicans was more liberal, less anti-American, and more European than de Gaulle's.[12] Giscard considers himself a European as well as a Frenchman. He advocates an active French participation in the EEC, and envisions France as an integral part of the

European community rather than an isolated and priviledged member. He does not foresee the political unification of Western Europe, however. In nuclear policy, he still guards the autonomy of France's nuclear strike force. Giscard does not share de Gaulle's Anglophobia; in June 1976 he became the first French president in sixteen years to visit Britain.[13] He also enjoys a close personal relationship with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Improved relations among Paris, London, Bonn, and Washington have prompted Giscard to reconsider France's NATO position.[14]

Pompidou reinstated Giscard as minister of finance in 1969. After the death of Pompidou in April 1974, Giscard won a closely contested election victory from Socialist candidate François Mitterrand by a margin of less than 400,000 votes.[15] He faces an equally strong challenge from the same quarter in the presidential election of 1981.[16]

This comparison of the presidential styles of de Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard draws heavily upon the precedent of such American social scientists as James David Barber. His classic study of American presidential styles deals mainly with the elements of personality that determine a man's performance in office.[17] Barber attempts to fit presidents into specifically defined categories, which serve as instruments of analysis. This study will address broader aspects of presidential style, focusing upon the attitudes and actions of three individual decision-makers within the context of de Gaulle's Fifth Republic.

More than in most countries, France's institutional framework permits its president virtual autonomy in the conduct of foreign affairs. The character of France's president, therefore, largely determines the character of French foreign policy. France's activities abroad readily reflect the ideals, values, motivations, perceptions, prejudices, and idiosyncracies of its chief executive.

This thesis will demonstrate the effect of individual style on the exercise of French foreign policy during the tenure of each of the three presidents. It will (1) examine the specific philosophies and experiences that influenced each man's world view; (2) analyze the conditions that affected each president's foreign policies; (3) study the support and opposition that each encountered in attempting to achieve his objectives; (4) enumerate the results that each hoped to achieve in the realm of foreign policy; and (5) explore the effect of each man's style upon the international community. In order to limit the scope of this study to manageable proportions, it will consider only three issues in depth: France's role in the European Economic Community, France's view of NATO and its nuclear strike force, and France's relations with the Eastern and Western blocs.

The topic will be treated according to the following plan. Chapter One will examine de Gaulle and his conception of France's role in the world. Chapters Two and Three will deal with the foreign policies of Pompidou and Giscard respectively. Chapter Four will offer a comparative analysis of the three leaders.

CHAPTER I

De Gaulle

Charles de Gaulle was one of the most articulate speakers and prolific writers of the modern era and expressed himself on a wide range of topics. His first book, entitled Discord Among the Enemy, was published in 1924. De Gaulle's biographer, Jean Lacouture, describes his first work as "a very interesting little book, made up of five studies denouncing, one after another, the encroachments of military authority on the civil power in imperial Germany, and finding in those encroachments the fundamental reason for the collapse of the State at the end of 1918. Charles de Gaulle was to publish better books ... The 'primitive' among the literary works of de Gaulle has a clarity of line, a sharpness of approach, which is often lacking in the majestic ornamentation--and even in the skillful omissions--of the later essays."[1]

De Gaulle wrote Discard Among the Enemy while a prisoner of war in Ingolstadt, Germany. Seriously wounded on three separate occasions, he was taken prisoner after a close action at Douaumont on March 2, 1916. As a second lieutenant of the Thirty-third Infantry Regiment he wrote, "It appeard in the wink of an eye that all the virtue in the

world could not prevail against superior firepower."[2] Nicknamed "the Constable" by his fellow prisoners, he spent the next thirty-two months in five different internment camps.

De Gaulle published his second work, entitled The Edge of the Sword, in 1932. Throughout the book he tried to reconcile the roles of the statesman and the soldier. In his foreword he appeared to favor the soldier.

> Force has watched over civilizations in the cradle; force has ruled empires, and dug the grave of decadence; force gives laws to the peopls and controls their destinies. It is true to say that the fighting spirit, the art of war, the virtues of the soldier, are an integral part of man's inheritance. They have been part and parcel of history in all its phases, the medium through which it has expressed itself.[3]

It was difficult for de Gaulle to reconcile the man of force and action (soldier) with the man of tact and letters (statesman) without sacrificing one to the other. He seemed perplexed by this dichotomy in his own personality. In the closing chapter of The Edge of the Sword he concluded that the two roles were mutually supportive. "There is no soldier who, by winning fame for himself, has not served the hopes and aims of high policy, nor any statesman who, by the greatness of his achievements, has not won still a greater glory by contributing to the defense of his country."[4]

De Gaulle published The Army of the Future while still a captain in the army and an instructor at the military college at St. Cyr. Released in 1934, this work stressed the need for a career army quite unlike the conscription-based

popular armies of the Napoleonic era and the First World War. He advocated the formation of mechanized divisions that could travel a hundred miles a day and attack the enemy from the rear with close air support. The French military establishment ignored his advice, placing its faith in the fixed fortifications of the Maginot Line. The German phenomenon of blitzkrieg (lightning warfare) adopted the very system that de Gaulle had suggested five years before. German tanks assisted by Stuka dive bombers swept across France in May 1940 in a six-week campaign that stunned the world. De Gaulle's work also predicted that the Germans would attack through the Ardennes, which according to conventional wisdom was unsuitable terrain for mechanized operations. His prediction proved painfully accurate. The General later claimed in his War Memoirs that Hitler's staff had read The Army of the Future aloud to him in 1934.

Though the work was not well received by French military planners, it was recognized for its quality outside of France. In the foreword to an English translation of the book published in 1941, editor Walter Millis offered the following appraisal of de Gaulle.

> But this book of Captain de Gaulle has a much greater importance today than that merely of a prediction from which others were to profit, of a neglected warning for which events were to provide a terrible justification. The obscure captain of 1934 is now the Leader of Free France, the man who snatched hope, energy, and resolution out of the vast wreck, who raised the banner while others were letting it fall and who may yet play a large role in

> the fate of his country and the world. The book brilliantly etches the quality of mind which he brings to the task. His record sufficiently demonstrates his capacities as a man of action: the book shows that he combines with them intellectual powers to which we are, perhaps, too little accustomed in our own military men. Here are that precision and lucidity of thought, that ability to grasp the problem of modern warfare as a whole, backed by a real sense of the past, a real knowledge of military history and even a genuine literary grace, which are the glory of the French military tradition.[5]

This glowing review, though biased, indicates that others sensed in de Gaulle the qualities of soldier and statesman at this early stage in his career.

De Gaulle published France and Its Army in 1938. In the course of 277 pages, he traced the history of the French army through various stages of development, specifically during the ancien regime, the revolution, the Napoleonic wars, the Franco-Prussian war, and World War I. Describing this work in his War Memoirs, he stated: "... in it I showed how, from century to century, the soul and fate of the country were constantly reflected in the mirror of its army; the final warning which, from my modest place, I addressed to my country on the eve of the cataclysm."[6]

The General began writing his War Memoirs during the 1950's. The three volumes were subtitled The Call to Honor 1940-1942, Unity 1942-1944, and Salvation 1944-1946. The first volume was published in 1954; the two subsequent tomes appeared in 1956 and 1959 respectively. The combined work is a substantial volume of some 1,000 pages that describes

de Gaulle's political, military, and symbolic roles in six years of French history. The War Memoirs recount and justify his participation in the battle of France, the establishment of Free France, the campaign in Africa, the invasion of Normandy, the liberation, the provisional government, and the birth of the Fourth Republic.

After his defeat in the referendum of April 27, 1969, de Gaulle retired from public life to finish his memoirs. He intended to publish a second trilogy, entitled Memoirs of Hope, to record the period 1958-1969. The series was to consist of the following volumes: Renewal 1958-1962, Effort 1962-1965, and Term 1966-1969. The author lived to finish the first volume and two chapters of the second. The series ends, therefore, with the spring of 1963.

There exists a wealth of primary sources about de Gaulle. All his speeches have been preserved, including his BBC address of June 18, 1940, his Bayeux speech of June 16, 1946, and numerous statements and press releases from the Fifth Republic. Some of de Gaulle's conversations also have survived. His associate André Malraux published a book entitled Felled Oaks: Conversations with de Gaulle in 1972.[7]

De Gaulle's Concept of his Role in History

There is a perennial argument among scholars over whether history brings forth men of destiny or men of destiny make history. Certain individuals when confronted with critical situations prove to be great leaders: Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Churchill fit this mold. Other men are associated with entire eras: Alexander the Great, Julius Ceasar, and Louis XIV

are examples. There is a third category which encompasses both of the preceding types: this is the man with resources of mind and character, who is both a product and a symbol of his times. Charles de Gaulle was such a man. He possessed a flair for the dramatic that impelled him to participate in the affairs of the world. After serving an apprenticeship that lasted half a century, he was equipped to attempt to shape history to his own ends.

He was imbued with a sense of mission. In the first page of his War Memoirs, he stated that the notionns of historical France and greatness was inseparable. He served his apprenticeship as an army officer, resistance leader, head of the provisional government, and political figure. In 1958, at the age of 67, he was called upon to extricate France from political, military, and economic chaos. During the first decade of the Fifth Republic, he set out to restore France's greatness.

In The Edge of the Sword (1932) de Gaulle describes the process by which certain men become in history. Their desire to serve leads to train for the future. They must possess a certain flair, intelligence, and eagerness to participate that encourage the development of ability and strength of character. According to de Gaulle, nothing great will ever be achieved without great men, and men are only great if they are determined to be so. As examples, he cites the British Prime Minister Disraeli and the French Marshal Foch. The author maintains that Disraeli taught himself to think like

a prime minister in his youth, and that Foch demonstrated his potential as a commander-in-chief while he was an obscure instructor.[8] De Gaulle wrote these words while he himself was an obscure instructor.

The author then describes the second phase, in which the trained man influences the course of events. For de Gaulle this required a certain inspiration. He notes that amtitious young men, especially those of high rank, should exhibit enthusiasm if not an obsession for leaving their mark on events. In his stilted prose, he asserts that "from the shore on which they live their uneventful lives, they should direct their eyes to the stormy seas of History!"[9]

De Gaulle's prescription for greatness also entailed a willingness to accept isolation. In The Edge of the Sword, his description of the leader foreshadowed the imperious personality that would emerge as "The General." He wrote that "the man of character ... is inevitably aloof, for there can be no authority without prestige, nor prestige unless he keeps his distance."[10] This aspect of de Gaulle's character prompted biographer Jean Lacouture to describe him as "Charles the Alone."[11] De Gaule was ever conscious of his role in world history. The following summary seeks to examine this role.

Historical Summary

French foreign policy after World War II was concerned primarily with three issues: decolonization, the political and economic reconstruction of Europe, and the re-establishment of France as a world power. The surrender

of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 sounded the death knell for French hegemony in Southeast Asia. Morocco and Tunisia were granted independence in 1956. The war in Algeria, which erupted on November 1, 1954, seemed to defy solution. Germany's entry into NATO was approved in 1954, and France joined the EEC in 1957. Though the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1944 had solidified relations between Paris and Moscow, France continued to pursue a policy of non-alignment with either the Soviet bloc or the Western alliance. France's NATO commitment was its only contribution to the collective security of Western Europe.

By 1958 France's involvement in Algeria had deepened, and the possibility of civil war in France further aggravated the situation. French generals in Algiers were fomenting open rebellion, which accentuated the need for a strong leader. On May 13, 1958, extremists in Algiers forced the government to a showdown, and Premier Pierre Pflimlin and President René Coty turned to General de Gaulle. The National Assembly approved de Gaulle as premier on June 1, 1958, by a vote of 329 to 244.[12] The General then dissolved parliament, and a majority of the electoral college subsequently confirmed his appointment as chief executive.

A new constitution, which accorded the president sweeping powers, went into effect on October 4 after being ratified by the French electorate. Article Five of the constitution grants the president internal and external powers. Article Eight specifies that the president appoints the prime

minister and "on proposal of the premier, he appoints other members of the government." The president's military powers are defined in Article Fifteen. "The president is chief of the armies. He presides over the high councils and committees of national defense." Article Fifty-two prescribes that "the president of the republic negotiates and ratifies treaties." Thus, in the Fifth Republic, the president is chief of state, responsible for all cabinet appointments, commander in chief of the armed forces, and chief diplomatic negotiator. One analyst has noted that "the constitution evolved throughout the Gaullist period--and ... during Pompidou's presidency--in the direction of presidential dominance."[13]

The constitution also provides for specific emergency powers. Article Sixteen allows the president to invoke these powers in time of crisis after "consultation with the premier, the presidents of the assemblies, and the constitutional council." Though required by law to consult with government leaders, the president is not bound by their advice. He may therefore become the sole decision-maker by invoking the emergency powers. De Gaulle exercised this prerogative only once, from April 23 until September 29, 1961, in response to the Generals' Revolt in Algeria. On April 22, 1961, Generals Challe, Salan, Zeller, and Jouhaud mutinied, threatening to drop paratroopers at Orly and overthrow the government.[14] The General invoked the emergency powers for a five-month period in order to subvert the efforts of the Organization of the Secret Army (OAS), which sought to depose him.

There were several unsuccessful attempts on de Gaulle's life during this period.

Article Thirty-eight grants the president the power "to issue ordinances, for a limited period, concerning matters that are normally in the domain of laws." The general issued several such executive decrees during the summer of 1961.

Article Eleven allows the president to "submit to referendum any government bill ... which, without being contrary to the constitution, would have implications for the functioning of institutions." De Gaulle used this power five times. Just over 53 percent of the French people voted against this final measure. Having staked his tenure in office on support for this issue, de Gaulle resigned from the presidency immediately.

The three powers--to declare a state of emergency, to issue decrees that have the force of law, and to call for referenda--give the president near dictatorial authority. Inherent in these articles was de Gaulle's desire to bypass the National Assembly, to invoke executive priviledge, and to appeal directly to the people. These provisions reflected de Gaulle's basic distrust of deputies and the legislature and his wish to reserve ultimate power for the executive.

Louis XIV's famous dictum "I am the state" found its twentieth-century counterpart in the words of Charles de Gaulle. Speaking to General Salan, supreme commander of the French forces in Algeria in 1958, de Gaulle is reported to

TABLE 1

ISSUES DECIDED BY REFERENDUM UNDER DE GAULLE

Date	Issue	Result
September 28, 1958	Approval of the 1958 Constitution	Yes
January 8, 1961	Self-determination for Algeria	Yes
April 8, 1962	Algerian independence as specified in the Evian Accords	Yes
October 28, 1962	Amendment of the constitution to provide for direct popular election of the president	Yes
April 27, 1969	Reorganization of the Senate and the establishment of regional councils	No

have remarked, "I am the minister of Algeria."[15] In his War Memoirs de Gaulle repeatedly asserted that he was the personification of France during the Nazi occupation. In a radio broadcast on June 18, 1940 from the BBC in London, the General exhorted his fellow countrymen neither to assume the mantle of defeat nor to abandon the struggle.

> But has the last word been said? Must we abandon all hope? Is our defeat final and irremediable? To these questions I answer--NO!
> Speaking in full knowledge of the facts, I ask you to believe me when I say that the cause of France is not lost. The very factors that brought about our defeat may one day lead us to victory.[16]

These words prompted thousands of Frenchmen to cross the English Channel and join de Gaulle's Free French movement or to join the resistance in France. As leader of the organized effort the General symbolized Free France during the four years of occupation. It was to this man, who was the embodiment of tradition, that the Fourth Republic turned in 1958. It comes as no surprise that de Gaulle assumed a great deal of power after being elected president of the Fifth Republic.

De Gaulle's program for dealing with Algeria consisted of four parts: (1) France embarked upon a major program of economic development, which included a $200 million annual investment in the production of Sahara oil; (2) counter-insurgency efforts were expanded, as conscripts and special guerrilla units arrived from the mainland; (3) social changes more all-encompassing than those proposed by Guy Mollet's

Republican Front in 1956, including the enfranchisement of women, were implemented; and (4) a sustained effort was made to enlist international support for the French cause, and to keep the United Nations out of the conflict.[17]

When his program failed to satisfy the FLN, de Gaulle began to consider the alternatives. These included a sovereignty-association arrangement, very similar to that which the Quebec separatists have proposed to the Canadian government, which would maintain economic ties but sever existing political bonds.[18] Two other distinct possibilities were outright secession and self-determination. De Gaulle decided that French prestige would benefit by granting self-determination and would suffer by contesting the right of secession. He therefore proposed Algerian independence in the spring of 1962. The Evian Accords were signed on February 21, 1962, implemented on March 19, 1962, and ratified by popular referendum in metropolitan France on April 8, 1962.[19]

The Algerian conflict was one of the bloodiest in French history. It is estimated that as many as one million Muslims died in the fighting, and French casualities are estimated at 27,000 killed and 65,000 wounded. After the war, the French officer corps returned to France along with some 400,000 draftees and approximately one million French citizens of Algeria.[20] For the first time in more than twenty years, French soldiers were not dying overseas.

Although de Gaulle focused his attention on Algeria between 1958 and 1962, he also concentrated on France's East-West relations. One scholar has identified three distinct periods of interaction between France and the superpowers under de Gaulle: 1958-62, 1963-68, and 1968-69.[21] Between 1958 and 1962, American dominance of the Atlantic alliance frustrated de Gaulle. He tended to favor the Soviet Union in his relations with the superpowers, particularly as the strategic balance shifted toward the United States after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. The period 1963 to 1968 is noteworthy for France's independence of both blocs, but especially of the West. Three incidents illustrate this change. On January 4, 1963, de Gaulle rejected Kennedy's proposal for a multilateral nuclear force consisting of the United States, Britain and France. He also vetoed Britain's bid to enter the European Economic Community (EEC) on Januar 14, 1963. His most dramatic gesture was France's withdrawal from NATO in 1966. The final period, 1968 and 1969, saw France gravitate toward the West once again. One analyst has noted that de Gaulle's "opening to the east" ended abruptly when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968.[22]

Perhaps the most perplexing of de Gaulle's foreign policy decisions was his withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance. On March 10-11, 1966, he sent a memorandum to the NATO allies announcing his intention to expel foreign troops from French soil, to dismantle certain installations and military bases

belonging to foreign powers, and to disengage the French military from active participation in the alliance. He had previously refused to allow NATO to stockpile nuclear weapons in France, had prevented the emplacement of intermediate-range ballistic missile silos on French soil, and had forced tactical wings of NATO fighter-bombers to find bases in Germany rather than in France. The French fleet had disengaged from NATO maneuvers as early as June 21, 1963. In retrospect, Professor Edward Kolodziej considers de Gaulle's announcement of March 10, 1966 more a natural culmination of events than a departure from past policy.[23] Jean Lacouture agrees.

> The assault on NATO began in February 1966. Nothing could have been more foreseeable. In many respects it was a gesture that gave expression to all of the deepest impulses and prejudices on which his diplomacy is based: cynicism and ruthlessness in the relations between states (even so-called friendly states); supremacy of national sovereignty over any ideological concept of alliance; France's standing among nations. But however typical it was of Gaullist diplomacy, the gesture--being so tough, so abrupt, so challenging--succeeded in taking everyone by surprise.[24]

As a final gesture the General even restricted the number of NATO flights allowed in French air space. His policy toward the Atlantic alliance aimed to decrease French participation in regional security arrangements and to further France's independence.

French nuclear policy, which is based upon de Gaulle's nuclear strike force, illustrates his notion of independence. On September 17, 1958, de Gaulle addressed a memorandum to President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Mac-Millan, and NATO Secretary General Henry Spaak stating that it was not the intention of France to limit its foreign policy within "the confines of NATO."[25] He proposed the establishment of a London-Paris-Washington "directorate" to replace American leadership of the organization. Each of the three powers would be able to veto the decisions of the others; unanimity was thus required. Each power would assume responsibility for a specific sphere of influence in the Western world. Paris, naturally, claimed North Africa. The directorate would formulate a joint military and political strategy, create allied commands around the globe, and conduct strategy deliberations on the employment of nuclear weapons.

Eisenhower rejected the proposal outright, prompting an incensed de Gaulle to announce that France had no choice but to steer an independent course. France exploded its first atomic bomb in the Sahara desert on February 13, 1960.[26] De Gaulle then ambitiously embarked upon the construction of sixty-two Mirage IV bombers, each of which was designed to carry a sixty-kiloton weapon with three times the destructive power of the bobm dropped on Hiroshima.[27] By 1968 France had build thirty-six of the bombers, which together carried weapons with the destructive equivalent of one Minuteman II intercontinental ballistic missile. One disadvantage of the

Mirage IV bomber was that in order to strike the Soviet Union it had to refuel in mid-flight somewhere over Poland. One critic has noted that de Gaulle underestimated the technical problems involved in developing the nuclear strike force, while overestimating France's ability to finance it.[28]

Subsequent generations of French nuclear weaponry have included a surface-to-surface missile capable of delivering a 240-kiloton warhead at a range of 1,800 to 2,000 miles. These missiles are located in concrete silos in the Albian plateau of Haute Provence in southern France. France also introduced two nuclear submarines to its fleet in 1972. These submarines together carried thirty-two missiles with a capacity of 500 kilotons each and a range of 2,000 miles.[29] (Note: a one kiloton weapon has the destructive power of 1,000 tons of dynamite; thermonuclear weapons have the added destructive force of blast, which is the heat released in nuclear fission.)

Observers have cited various reasons for de Gaulle's apparent obsession with an independent nuclear strike force. Perhaps he intended to boost the morale of the army afterthe losses in Indochina and Algeria, or to restore public confidence in the nation's ability to defend itself. De Gaulle believed that nuclear weaponry was the great equalizer among nation-states; the nuclear strike force satisfied his notion of grandeur. Also, because he never believed that the Americans would use nuclear weapons except in defense of their own territory, the nuclear strike force satisfied his desire for security and a credible French deterrent.[30]

De Gaulle refused to sign any accord designed to prevent the dissemination and development of nuclear weapons. On August 5, 1963, more than one hundred nations signed the nuclear test ban treaty, which was sponsored by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. The treaty called for a moratorium on nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. It placed no restrictions on underground testing, however. Neither Communist China nor France participated in the agreement. De Gaulle believed that by acquiescing to the demands of his allies he would relegate France to the status of a second-rate power.[31]

De Gaulle's dream of a strong Europe that woud compensate for the superpowers led him to propose a loose political alliance within the Common Market. Christian Fouchet, the French ambassador to Denmark, presented the plan to a meeting of "The Six" in July 1961. Another de Gaulle trial balloon, the Fouchet plan consisted of the following proposals: political union of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and West Germany; formation of a joint council of foreign ministers; cooperation in cultural, educational, and scientific matters; and a legal union of European peoples. "The Six" debated the proposals individually and approved parts of them; they rejected the plan as a whole, however. France's trading partners found the idea of a council of foreign ministers particularly objectionable. None of the delegates favored the prospect of answering to de Gaulle in matters of foreign policy. The French president attempted to

coat the bitter pill with attractive concessions in the form of cultural, educational, and scientific cooperation, but his vision of a European bloc united before the superpowers never materialized.[32]

De Gaulle could be just as contentious as his Common Market partners, especially in the matter of Britain's application for membership in the EEC. There were two main reasons for France's reluctance to admit the British to the community: Britain seemed unwilling to relinquish its special relationship with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and it was particularly sensitive to the higher prices that prevailed in the European market as compared to the world market. In de Gaulle's view, Britain wanted to have its cake and eat it too. Why should he allow the British to expand their market by 300 million people, unless they were willing to sacrifice their lucrative economic ties with the Commonwealth countries and accept European market prices without complaint? There was no reason for admitting Britain because, in de Gaulle's view, the British were no more European than the Americans. The General vetoed Britain's bid for entry on January 14, 1963.[33] That evening he defended his action with the following statement. "It is quite possible that one day England will be metamorphosed sufficiently to join the European community without restrictions or reservations ... It is also possible that England will not change, and the feeling that this is what will happen seems to be the outcome of the very lengthly conversations in Brussels."[34]

The Dutch and some other members of the EEC had favored British membership all along.[35] Prospects for the British case improved during the mid-sixties, especially after Britain distanced itself from American policies in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam.[36] On May 11, 1967, Britain re-submitted its proposal to join the EEC. Again de Gaulle shelved the idea, which was not reconsidered until December 1969 under Pompidou.[37]

It is a fallacy to assume that de Gaulle opposed European integration.[38] Typically, though, he wanted it on his own terms or not at all. De Gaulle's vision differed from the European model of Jean Monnet, for example, in its essentials. De Gaulle favored a loosely-knit union of nation-states with converging interests, whereas Monnet preferred cooperation on an institutional level.[39] De Gaulle based his entire world view upon the primacy of the nation-state; Monnet considered the nation-state obsolete and unable to cope with complex international issues.[40] De Gaulle jealously guarded French sovereignty against encroachment by any regional organization, but Monnet believed that European integration only could be achieved through such organizations such as the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Defense Community, and Euratom.[41] Finally, de Gaulle sought to use a unified Europe to enhance French prestige: by allying with the Third World, Europe could offset the influence of the superpowers.

This was not what Jean Monnet had in mind.[42] De Gaulle had a confederal notion of European unity based on the nation-state; Monnet had a federal notion based on a European Parliament.[43] The two points of view were irreconcilable.

In an appraisal of de Gaulle's presidency, one critic has characterized him as preoccupied with foreign affairs to the virtual exclusion of domestic issues.

> In other countries, and especially in Britain and the United States, public opinion has so identified France with de Gaulle and his foreign policies that the rest of the complex French scene has tended to pass unnoticed. But de Gaulle is not typical of modern France. He has not been greatly interested in domestic affairs and has had little direct influence on them between 1958 and 1968 save to provide continuity of government. Only in rare moments of crises, like that which forced itself upon him in May 1968, will he descend from the heights to pay much attention to the desires of the mass French public.[44]

It is useful to examine the domestic situation in France during de Gaulle's presidency in order to understand the reasons for his departure.

During his first four years in office de Gaulle enjoyed a period of relative popularity that reached its zenith in April 1962, when 90 percent of the French electorate approved his decision to grant Algerian independence. The General encountered his first major opposition on October 5, 1962, when the Chamber of Deputies gave his premier a vote of no confidence over the issue of direct popular election of the president. De Gaulle dissolved parliament and called

for new legislative elections to take place as soon as a referendum had resolved the dispute. The voters approved de Gaulle's proposal by an overwhelming 62.25 percent of the vote on October 28, 1962.[45] In the subsequent legislative elections, the Gaullists returned 228 deputies to the National Assembly. The vote of no confidence actually resulted in an increase in Gaullist strength in parliament. Once again de Gaulle had employed the instrument of the popular referendum to his advantage.

The General did not fare as well in the presidential elections of December 1965. There was an unusually high turnout (84.75 percent of all registered voters) for the first ballot, of which de Gaulle won 44.64 percent with 10,828,523 votes. The Socialist François Mitterrand received 31.72 percent with 7,694,003 votes. Jean Lecanuet, the candidate of the center, received 15.57 percent of the vote and three different candidates split the remaining ten percent.[46] The returns troubled de Gaulle. During the two weeks between the first ballot and the run-off election, Premier Pompidou orchestrated an impressive campaign to woo marginal supporters back into the Gaullist camp. The effort proved successful. Voter turnout was high on December 19 as well, with 84.33 percent of registered voters participating. De Gaulle won 55.19 percent of the second ballot, with 13,083,699 votes. Mitterrand ran a distant second, with 36.74 percent or 10,619,735 votes.[47]

After 1965 de Gaulle's domestic base deteriorated rapidly. The nation experienced labor strikes, union unrest, unemployment, and inflation. In the legislative elections of 1967 the Gaullists lost their parliamentary majority for the first time and depended on the support of Giscard d' Estaing's Independent Republicans.[48] The final breakdown occurred during the student riots of May 1968. De Gaulle left Paris at the height of the demonstrations for a state visit to Rumania, leaving Premier Pompidou to handle the rapidly escalating crisis. The General was furious when he returned to find the Sorbonne occupied by student militants, barricades in the streets, and the situation worsening by the minute. De Gaulle blamed most of this on Pompidou.

On May 24, 1968, the General appeared on national television to appeal directly to the people for support. The 78-year-old president, obviously shaken and weary, did not project the commanding presence of June 18, 1940. His old charm appeared to have failed him.

Giscard and his Independent Republicans openly opposed de Gaulle in the referendum of April 27, 1969, which proposed regional reform and reorganization of the Senate. Realizing the possible consequences of his action, the General left a two-line message at the Elysée Palace for use in case his initiative failed. The message was simple and direct. "I am ceasing to exercise my functions as president of the republic. This decision will take effect today at midnight."[49] He then returned to his home at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises to awai the results of the referendum.

It is ironic that a domestic issue was responsible for de Gaulle's resignation. In a conversation with de Gaulle after the referendum, André Malraux asked, "Why did you leave on a question as secondary as that of the regions?"

"Because of the absurdity," replied de Gaulle.[50]

One analyst has observed that "the May events amounted to an unscheduled referendum on ten years of Gaullist rule."[51] This statement helps explain the results of the referendum held the following year. The French electorate was ready for a change, and the referendum provided them an opportunity to vent their frustrations. The General settled in to write his second set of memoirs. He did at home on Monday, November 9, 1970.

Charles de Gaulle's View of the World

Charles de Gaulle's world view was based fundamentally on the notion of the supremacy of the nation-state over ideology. He believed that the nation-state (the nation being the people and the state their institutions) would survive any historical challenge by an ideology, particularly Marxism. De Gaulle thought Marx's "masses" did not exist.[52] He believed that, in the final analysis, the people would obey and support only the nation-state.[53] One analyst has summarized de Gaulle's philosophy as follows.

> General de Gaulle's foreign policy is constructed on a foundation of three major ideas. France must occupy a place in the front rank of nations. Relations between states--whether allied or not--are based on power and guile. Ideologies are of relatively little importance, and the only real forces confronting each other in the international arena are individual nations.[54]

De Gaulle himself expressed it best in his classic statement: "A state worthy of the name has no friends."[55]

In de Gaulle's international order, there were four groups (ensembles) of states. The first group comprised those states under the influence of the United States, especially Canada and Great Britain. The second included Western Europe, in particular those states that constituted the Common Market. Great Britain was excluded from this grouping because of its special economic and military relationship with the United States. The third ensemble consisted of those nations aligned with the Soviet Union, particularly Eastern Europe and Cuba. The fourth group included all the so-called non-aligned developing countries, especially China and the Third World.

In de Gaulle's view, the international system established at the Yalta Conference, to which de Gaulle was not invited, was illegitimate and unstable. In order to restore the system to equilibrium, several events had to take place. First, the United States must withdraw its conventional forces from Europe, leaving its nuclear umbrella intact. Then, France could negotiate a Soviet withdrawal from East Germany by playing on the Soviet desire to stabilize its western frontier and strengthen its defenses along the Chinese border. This move would establish a "European entente from the Atlantic to the Urals."[56] De Gaulle's scheme seems unrealistic at best, even to an impartial observer. Because de Gaulle considered Russia tied by geography, history, and race to Europe, he included it in his "Atlantic to the Urals" definition of Europe. "Russia, for all its deviationalist ideology, authoritarian

regime, and expansionist pretensions, remained European and ultimately could be assimilated, de Gaulle felt, within his world view."[57] His definition of Europe did not include Britain, however.

The de Gaulle Style

A close examination of Charles de Gaulle's treatment of problems in French foreign policy reveals few clearly discernible patterns of behavior. The French leader was unpredictable. In order to appreciate Gaullist foreign polity, it is necessary to understand the man. In the words of one French historian, "It seems somewhat arbitrary to determine what is Gaullist and what is not in politics ... because de Gaulle himself often changed his mind."[58] To attempt to define Gaullist foreign policy is no easy task; Gaullism was quite often whatever General de Gaulle decreed it to be. Another observer has summed up the de Gaulle style as follows.

> Everything was thus made crystal clear: de Gaulle alone would handle foreign policy and it would be his policy. He did so cautiously until the referendum in October 1962. After that he grew increasingly daring: he throttled the opposition. Parliament no longer deliberated on the major foreign policy options. It debated academically the consequences of the chief of state's unilateral decisions. The Council of Ministers was informed à posteriori. Georges Pompidou acknowledged that only three ministers had prior knowledge of the decision to withdraw from NATO. Going over the heads of the intermediary bodies, de Gaulle announced his decisions to the French people and presented his comments to the press.[59]

De Gaulle's style in dealing with allies was as frustrating as it was effective. He often employed the politics of the empty chair at conferences and negotiations. This gesture was intended to detract from the legitimacy of the proceedings by dramatizing the absence of an important partner. The advantage of this tactice was that de Gaulle could indignantly announce to the world that neither he nor his representatives had been consulted on an issue, and that therefore any agreements concluded were not binding on the French people. When not openly boycotting an assembly, French delegates often employed the tactic of frontal assault against the most powerful ally present, usually the United States. This ploy of opposition for its own sake became known as the politics of "no," which de Gaulle and his envoys practiced with great success among enemies and allies alike.[60] Jean Lacouture has noted that "until his challenge to NATO in 1966, Gaullist diplomacy--that mixture of effervescent swagger, icy realism, and generosity--was a tradition which no Frenchman could disown without being unduly cynical."[61]

Survey research indicates that de Gaulle's attack on NATO strengthened rather than weakened his position among his followers.[62] The withdrawal from NATO is a classic example of the politics of "no" and the politics of the empty chair.

The most obvious factor influencing de Gaulle's presidential style was his military background. He had commanded the Fourth Armored Division during the Battle of France,

leading counterattacks against the cities of Laon and Abbeville.[63] He knew the true face of war, including retreat, defeat and humiliation. The measure of a man is not how he handles success, but how he handles failure. De Gaulle learned early that effort is only rewarded when it is crowned by success. There is no doubt that his military experiences exerted considerable influence over his presidential style. De Gaulle remained "the General" until his dying day.

As The Edge of the Sword suggested, de Gaulle considered the roles of statesman and soldier perfectly compatible: each contributed to the overall welfare of the nation. Each entailed a certain distance from the people; de Gaulle was fully aware that this distance was necessary to preserve his mystique. The familiar image of the General striding down the Champs-Elysée after the liberation of Paris in August 1944 remained indelibly imprinted upon the memories of a generation of Frenchmen. The General was in a class by himself, and he deliberatly cultivated the image of being different than the average mortal. This is one reason why he refused to participate in postwar partisan politics. He believed that domestic politics were beneath a man of his stature; to enter the political arena would deprive him of the main advantage he enjoyed over other leaders--his mystique. Rather than invite comparison with other men, de Gaulle chose to depart from the political scene in 1946. By divorcing himself from the activities of the Fourth Republic, he preserved his districtiveness and became the only attractive political alternative in 1958.

De Gaulle made a conscious effort to identify himself as a military hero and a retired statesman rather than a politician. He groomed himself for public office on his own terms and bided his time patiently.

It is no coincidence that a military crisis brought de Gaulle to power. The Algerian dilemma transcended partisan politics; it required a solution that was acceptable to the government, the army, and the people. Algeria pitted a rebellious army against an ineffective government, and it was soon apparent that the army had the upper hand. De Gaulle met the needs of France in 1958 perfectly. He was a military man who could deal with the generals in Africa, but he was also a statesman with the best interests of France at heart. His reputation as a soldier and statesman made him the obvious choice for premier and for president. De Gaulle rode on overseas policy question rather than a domestic issue into office; this would set the tone for his presidential style.

From the start, de Gaulle spurned domestic political structures and politicians in carrying out his Algerian policy. The constitution of the Fifth Republic established executive primary in foreign affairs at the expense of the legislature. De Gaulle's use of popular referenda to decide issues reflected his plebiscitarian concept of government. He viewed politicians as the representatives of special interests who could not be trusted to protect the national interest. The people were sovereign; only they could decide what was best for France.

Before submitting issues to referendum, de Gaulle tried to gauge the mood of the electorate. Those issues that he believed would pass were brought before the forum of popular opinion; more controversial issues were shelved or solved behind the scenes. During his honeymoon period with the French electorate between 1958 and 1962, the voters approved all four of the initiatives he proposed.

The resolution of the Algerian crisis in 1962 caused a shift in de Gaulle's support. The regular army returned to metropolitan France. For the first time since 1940, the French army was not fighting an overseas war. French society assimilated returning residents of Algeria with relative ease, especially along the Meditteranean coast. The Gaullist Union for the New Republic made impressive gains in the National Assembly. The year 1962 marked the high tide of de Gaulle's popularity.

At peace for the first time in twenty-two years, Frenchmen seemed to become more introspective. After Algeria de Gaulle's image began to suffer. His poor showing on the first ballot of the presidential election of 1965, the Gaullist losses in the legislative elections of 1967, the student riots in 1968, and his final defeat in the referendum of 1969 all serve to illustrate the gradual erosion of his base of support. As France turned its political gaze inward, de Gaulle's fortunes declined. Though the army and parliament opposed him initially, he managed to appease the former and neutralize

the latter. A majority of voters approved his policies in the beginning, but the same majority repudiated him in 1969.

Charles de Gaulle's foreign policy may be summarized briefly: he wanted a powerful, prestigious, independent France. In trying to accomplish these objectives, he pursued policies that were opportunistic and unpredictable. Bowing to the political exigencies of the times, and acknowledging colonialism as a relic of the past, he freed Algeria. One analyst has remarked that de Gaulle sacrificed Algeria on the altar of French prestige and grandeur. De Gaulle always had the interests of France in mind; had he sought a military solution to the Algerian problem, he would have weakened France militarily, economically, and in terms of international prestige. By granting Algerian independence, he avoided prolonging the agony.

De Gaulle did not succeed in his goal of making France a world power. Even with its nuclear strike force, France is at best a second-rate power in the modern world. De Gaulle's detractors have argued that his delusions of grandeur caused him to squander billions of francs on nuclear armaments, money that could have been better invested in France's domestic economy.

The General did manage to avoid affiliation with either superpower bloc. He tried to maintain a strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. For example, he opposed the American presence in Southeast Asia, and protested when President Johnson sent the Marines into

Santa Domingo in 1965. He also opposed the Soviet threat to Berlin in 1948, and criticized the Soviets throughout the Cuban missile cirsis in 1962.[64]

De Gaulle's love-hate relationship with the Western allies clearly illustrates his unpredictable nature. His anti-Israeli policy was particularly unpopular in Washington. France began to disengage itself from Israel after the 1967 Six-Day War.[65] On June 2, 1967, two days after the outbreak of the war, de Gaulle halted the sale of Mirage fighter-bombers to the Israelis, though he continued to allow the shipment of war material, including helicopters and gunboats. An Israeli commando raid on Beirut airport on December 28, 1968, provoked de Gaulle's wrath. He announced a total embargo of Israel.[66]

De Gaulle's critics have argued that his compaign to exclude Britain from the EEC may have been in retaliation for the rough treatment he received in London between 1940 and 1944. His intransigence toward Britain is often cited as evidence of his inability to forget the inustices of the past. Yet this same man effected a historic rapprochment with Chancellor Conrad Adenauer of Germany in 1962-63. De Gaulle was well received in Germany, where he charmed audiences with speeches delivered in German. He had learned the language well during his three years as a prisoner during World War I.

Similarly, critics have traced de Gaulle's strained relations with the United States to his non-too-cordial relationship with President Roosevelt during World War II.[67]

This explanation is too simplistic to merit serious consideration. Simply stated, the French president was unpredictable.

Conclusions

(1) De Gaulle's experiences as an army officer molded his world view. A man of action, he disliked ponderous institutions like the National Assembly. He avoided participation in partisan politics, preferring "man of the hour" situations.

(2) The Fifth Republic was born of a foreign crisis. After 1962, domestic conditions contributed to de Gaulle's downfall.

(3) The French people supported de Gaulle in four referenda held between 1958 and 1962. After Algeria, his base of support withered.

(4) The General achieved his objectives of power, prestige, and independence only partially. The nuclear strike force is a vestige of his desire for all three.

(5) General de Gaulle's style recalls a vivid image of the man to this day. But arrogance is not the stuff of which alliances are made. De Gaulle tended to alienate rather than appease, to confront rather than cooperate. For this his critics will never forgive him. There is no doubt that he was a product of the past, perhaps even an anachronism, but he was always a unique personality.

CHAPTER II

Pompidou

At first glance, Georges Pompidou does not seem the type of man to become president of France. For two decades, he lived in the shadow of his mentor, Charles de Gaulle, serving as the General's inconspicuous aide-de-camp. Pompidou dealt with matters that de Gaulle considered "housekeeping", such as financing the campaigns of the struggling Gaullist parties. In the legislative elections of 1951, the Rally of the French People (RFP) managed to win 21.20 percent of the popular vote on the first ballot, largely through the efforts of Pompidou. Again in November 1958, the Union for the New Republic (UNR) won 20 percent of the vote in the legislative elections. The General, always aloof from party politics, did not participate in either campaign.[1]

As president, de Gaulle concerned himself with prestigious matters of state, while his second-in-command kept his political house in order. Pompidou was on a first-name basis with more Gaullist deputies than the General admitted to knowing, and he kept political in-fighting to a minimum. By scratching backs and smoothing ruffled feathers, Pompidou helped steer the Gaullist majority along

the path desired by its leader, and helped mold it into a cohesive and effective governing body. De Gaulle disdainfully referred to the National Assembly as "the kitchen" and to politics as "the soup."[2] Georges Pompidou kept the lid on the boiling kettle.

A schrewd businessman and intimate of France's distinguished Rothschild family, Pompidou was at ease in the financial world. During the General's postwar exile from politics, Pompidou served as a director of the Rothschild bank. The business contracts he cultivated during this period proved invaluable when de Gaulle asked him to return to the Elysée Palace in 1958 as chief of staff. Four years later de Gaulle appointed Pompidou premier, a position that he held until the General dismissed him in 1968. Pompidou's tenure at the Hotel Matignon signaled a new phase in the de Gaulle era: his status as de Gaulle's right-hand man was official and sanctioned by law. It became increasingly apparent that the General was grooming Pompidou as his successor. After 1965 Pompidou campaigned for the presidency, first discreetly, then openly, and his election to office in 1969 proved a natural culmination of events. Pompidou's success story is an interesting one, considering that the man was by temperament more an administrator than a politician. One author has called Pompidou's meteoric rise to power "the Pompidou enigma," which he described as follows.

> Judging by appearances, Georges Pompidou advanced in life as if on a cushion of air. Doors opened before him. His career was spectular. He was admitted to l'Ecole Normale Supérieure without much effort on his part. He graduated first in his class with the regrets of the examining board: it was he who had worked the least. As a professor, he wanted to do something else, to participate in the excitement of the liberation. A friend introduced him to General de Gaulle's staff. Another friend directed him to the Council of State. He knew nothing about law. Two years later, his colleagues named him secretary general of their organization. De Gaulle asked Pompidou to work closely with him: soon Pompidou was the grand old man of the RPF. A chance acquaintance introduced him to the Rothschilds. He did not know a bill from a promissory note. k Soon he was director general at Rothschild. It wasn't yet the thirteenth of May (1958). The General wanted to appoint him director of his cabinet, a sort of vice president of the Council of Ministers. He returned to his bank. De Gaulle raised the bid, placing Pompidou at his side, at the head of the government, though he was neither an elected member, a deputy, nor a minister. Possessing the General's confidence, he may one day be president of the republic.[3]

Historical Summary

Georges Pompidou was thirty-three years old, a professor of literature working on a critical study of Racine's Britannicus, when he joined de Gaulle's provisional government in 1944. The General appointed the young professor to his cabinet as head of school and university affairs, a position demanding someone who could write well. When de Gaulle left the government on January 20, 1946, Pompidou found himself unemployed.

The two men went their separate ways for two years. De Gaulle retired to Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, and Pompidou joined the council of State. When de Gaulle's supporters formed the RPF in the spring of 1947, they asked Pompidou to join them. He served as finance chairman of the RPF until the party officially disbanded on March 5, 1952.

De Gaulle began writing his War Memoirs in 1952 and completed the first volume in the spring of 1954. He enlisted Pompidou's services as literary agent; the negotiations resulted in a satisfactory and lucrative contract. Later in 1954 Pompidou joined Baron Guy de Rothschild's bank. For the next five years he mingled with France's social and financial elite, gaining the respect and confidence of an important sector of the economy, and securing an appointment as director of the Rothschild bank.

The armed insurrection in Algiers on May 13, 1958, heralded the return of Charles de Gaulle to the political scene. Again de Gaulle asked Pompidou to join his cabinet. On June 1, 1958, the National Assembly voted de Gaulle back into power as president of the Council of Ministers and the General appointed Pompidou director of his cabinet. De Gaulle became president of the republic on December 21, 1958 after winning a majority of the electoral college.

Pompidou presided over the formation of the UNR that year as the Gaullists gained 212 seats in the National Assembly. De Gaulle remarked later that "history will never know the tremendous role played by Pompidou in the creation

of the Fifth Republic."[4] The General rewarded Pompidou for his loyalty by appointing Michel Debré as prime minister. On January 8, 1959, the first day of the newly-inaugurated Fifth Republic, Pompidou resigned from the government to reclaim his position at Rothschild.

Georges Pompidou returned to public service on April 14, 1962, replacing Michel Debré as premier of France. His star was on the rise. At the age of fifty-one, he boasted impressive credentials in four different pursuits: as an intellectual (university professor, 1936-1944); as an administrator (de Gaulle's chief of staff, 1948-52, 1958); as a financier (director of the Rothschild bank, 1954-62); and as a politician (premier of France, 1962-68). Pompidou was a man of many talents, a success by any definition.

His fortunes began to wan with de Gaulle's in March 1963, when inflation and a series of labor strikes racked France's economy. His reputation suffered greatly from his inability to offer immediate remedies to the social and economic ills that plagued the country. As was to happen in May 1968, the premier received the brunt of the criticism leveled at the government.

After de Gaulle's weak performance at the polls on the first ballot of the 1965 presidential elections, Pompidou pressed the General for the resignation of his minister of finance, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. One author has summarized Pompidou's argument as follows.

> By prolonging the austerity plan unduly, the minister of finance was largely responsible for the failure of December fifth. If we keep him on at the Rue de Rivoli (ministry of finance), we shall run the risk, for the same reasons, of suffering an even more serious setback in the 1967 (legislative) elections.[5]

De Gaulle liked Giscard. He countered that the young man was highly talented and that he seemed to have France's best interests at heart, a rare compliment coming from de Gaulle. Pompidou prevailed, however, and finally convinced the General that he must dismiss Giscard. The embittered minister of finance later charged that Pompidou's unbridled presidential aspirations had resulted in Giscard's dismissal, an accusation not to be discounted. It is possible that Pompidou felt threatened by what he perceived to be Giscard's rapidly expanding powers. The two men became bitter political enemies as a result of the 1965 incident. Michel Debré, whome de Gaulle had dismissed from the Matignon in 1962, was resurrected from political oblivion in 1965 to replacing Giscard as minister of finance.

Though silent at first, Giscard went into open opposition after de Gaulle's "Long live free Quebec!" speech in Montreal in 1967. His "Yes, but ... " attitude enraged the General, as did the Independent Republicans' criticism of de Gaulle's methods. When asked to evaluate the General's performance in Montreal, Pompidou remarked, "As for me, I wouldn't know how to dramatize things. That's not my style."[6] The young Turks of French politics were beginning to distance themselves from de Gaulle's style, Giscard in dramatic fashion, Pompidou more subtly.

In June 1968 de Gaulle decided to replace Pompidou for his indecisiveness during the student demonstrations of the previous month. He appointed Couve de Murville premier. After his dismissal Pompidou effected a reconciliation with Giscard, who remarked wryly, "I know how it feels to be dismissed."[7]

During his presidential campaign in May and June 1969, Pompidou adopted the slogan "Continuity and Opening."[8] This motto characterized the Pompidou style well: he could continue in the General's footsteps with certain well-chosen deviations from the path. At the outset he stressed continuity in his leadership. "It is enough for me to know that I am profoundly Gaullist," he told the press. "That is what guides me and determines my actions."[9]

The Gaullists were by no means united behind Pompidou, mainly because a longstanding rivalry existed between him and Jacques Chaban-Delmas, leader of the Gaullist majority. Before the 1969 election Pompidou agreed to ask Chaban-Delmas to be his prime minister in exchange for Gaullist support for his candidacy.[10] On June 1, 1969, Pompidou received the highest percentage of the first ballot with 43.95 percent. Two weeks later he defeated challenger Alain Poher in the run-off election with 57.58 percent of the vote.[11] As promised, he selected Chaban-Delmas as premier.

Pompidou enjoyed a comfortable majority (383 of 490 seats) in the National Assembly when he took office. The Gaullists had won 46.39 percent of the vote in the 1968 legislative elections.[12] Pompidou's parliamentary majority

included two hundred ninety Gaullist deputies, sixty Independent Republicans (the party of Giscard d'Estaing), and thirty-three centrists of the Progress and Modern Democracy parties. His opposition consisted primarily of Communists, Socialists, and splinter parties of the center-left.[13]

Pompidou rated consistently favorable responses in public opinion polls, averaging between 53 and 56 percent approval of his performance in office.[14] One analyst attributes this record to his strong public image. "One of the reasons for Pompidou's popularity ... was that he qualified as an intellectual. He was a graduate of a grande école, Normale Supérieure, he had written an essay on Racine, and he was the editor of an anthology of French poetry."[15] One indication of the French public's esteem for Pompidou was the naming of the Center for Arts, one of France's largest and most popular museums, for him.

Once in office Pompidou outlined a three-pronged program of "Completion, Development, and Enlargement." The Pompidou "triptych,"[16] as it became known, had three priorities: (1) Completion of a common agricultural policy would eliminate internal tariffs among the Six and would promote the implementation of a common external tariff; (2) development in depth was to include banking and monetary policy, taxation, social security legislation, and a common vote in foreign affairs (shades of the Fouchet Plan); and (3) enlargement of the Common Market meant admitting new members, most notably Great Britain.[17]

Pompidou's emphasis on expansion of ties with Western Europe, particularly within the framework of the EEC, stood in marked contrast to the policy of his predecessor. "Europe was the crucible of the Pompidou government's foreign policy. Western Europe was to be the principal vehicle for the realization of France's domestic and foreign policy goals. Pompidou abandoned the traditional Gaullist shibboleths of independence and grandeur in favor of 'completion, enlargement, and strengthening' of ties with Western Europe."[18]

Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway were admitted to the EEC in January 1972. Norway chose not to join.[19] On April 23, 1972, Pompidou submitted the issue of Britain's entry into the Common Market to popular referendum. Only 53 percent of registered voters turned out, partly because the Socialist opposition had advised its members to abstain. The Communists had urged a "no" vote on the grounds that the EEC endangered French national interests. Of those who voted, 68 percent were in favor. Of all registered voters, 37 percent were in favor, 17 percent were opposed, and 46 percent had abstained.[20]

The Pompidou government considered the vote a success, if not an overwhelming mandate. It is interesting to note that Pompidou used the referendum in much the same manner as de Gaulle. The plebiscite did not really decide the issue, because the members of the Common Market had decided early in April to admit Britain. Pompidou staged the referendum as a display of public confidence in his government.

Pompidou was host to the Paris Conference of the Nine of October 19-20, 1972. The newly enlarged Common Market now boasted 40 percent of the world's trade, 50 percent of the world's merchant marine, a population of 250 million, and one of the world's highest standards of living. Two members, Britain and France, possessed nuclear weapons. Pompidou tried to promote the idea of political integration, proposing that each nation send a minister of European affairs to Brussels. The conference adjourned without reaching an agreement.[21]

Pompidou's overture toward Britain constituted a complete reversal of de Gaulle's policy. This is especially puzzling considering the fact that continuity was one of the campaign standards of the Pompidou government. Professor Roy C. Macridis does not consider the admission of Britain to the EEC a break with the past, however. He maintains that de Gaulle was contemplating such a move toward the end of his term in office.[22]

Whereas de Gaulle had always preferred politics on a world scale, Pompidou proved himself willing to engage in European summitry. He was instrumental in organizing the conference of December 1969 (the Hague), October 1972 (Paris), and December 1973 (Copenhagen).[23] He was particularly active in the Copenhagen meeting of December 14-15, 1973, which was held to discuss the oil shortages Europe was experiencing in the wake of the Mideast war.[24]

France's three main oil suppliers between 1965 and 1972 were Algeria, Iraq, and Libya, all militant Arab states. France suffered a substantial trade deficit with all three during that six-year period.[25] In 1971, Pompidou ended France's special relationship with Algeria, giving independent oil companies free rein to deal with whomever they chose. Saudi Arabia quickly replaced Algeria as France's foremost supplier, while Algeria fell to number seven. No state now supplies more than 16 percent of France's oil needs, compared to the 31 percent Algeria provided in 1968. French supplies now come from many different sources, but no nation monopolizes the trade.[26] In spite of these precautions, the Arab oil embargo of 1974 hurt France. The inflation rate reached 14 percent in 1973 and 1974.[27]

Pompidou's definition of Europe differed greatly from de Gaulle's. The General's Europe stretched from the Atlantic to the Urals and included Russia while excluding Britain. Pompidou's Europe, by contrast, extended from the Thames to the Elbe and included Britain while excluding Russia. Pompidou's Europe was Western, Christian, capitalist and democratic.[28] Addressing his European allies at the Pompidou Conference in Paris on March 16, 1972, the French president cited a common "geography, lifestyle, a certain conception of democracy, and an evident political and economic interest"[29] that bound them. Pompidou's style at these summit meetings also contrasted with de Gaulle's. One observer of the French scene has noted that "Pompidou was more

disposed than this predecessor to treat France's partners as equals than as subordinates, creating thereby a more favorable climate for unity talks."[30]

Another detour from the Gaullist style was Pompidou's cooperation with the United States. Where de Gaulle had been combative, Pompidou was less so. He saw no inherent value in the politics of "no."

> President Pompidou, abhorring open conflict to a fault and sensitive to French weakness, preferred accommodating United States power where possible and adjusting to it when necessary. Better to work with United States influence than against it, even at the cost of a questionable international prestige in earning its ire. This was a commodity of doubtful economic and political marketability at home when the dominant objectives of the after 1968 were addressed to the prosperity and welfare of Frenchmen, not the grandeur and independence of the French nation.[31]

As president, Pompidou concerned himself with what de Gaulle contemptuously called "housekeeping". This shift in priorities was apparent in Pompidou's television address after the referendum of April 1972. "'What is Europe?' say people with a short-run view. 'Take care of France,' and of course, the government's task is to think first about France and about Frenchmen, about their prosperity, about their welfare, about the grandeur and independence of our country."[32] In summary, Pompidou was as concerned with the welfare of Frenchmen as he was with the grandeur of France. There was a genuine outpouring of public grief when Pompidou died on April 2, 1974.[33]

The Pompidou Style

In a 1965 biography of Georges Pompidou, the premier is quoted as having described himself in these modest terms: "In all my life, I have only made three or four decisions concerning myself--that of my marriage, that of leaving the university to work with General de Gaulle, that of leaving administration and politics to enter private business ... the rest were imposed upon me."[34] There is an element of truth in this self-appraisal, especially as it describes Pompidou's relationship with de Gaulle. As premier, he carried out de Gaulle's policy decisions to the best of his ability. He shone as an administrator. He performed equally well as president without the General's guidance and far from his imposing presence.

> Lacking de Gaulle's personal prestige, authority, and historical credentials, and endowed with a more reserved personality, President Pompidou viewed himself as ruling more by persuasion and manipulation than by command. He did not claim any special priviledge or right to rule other than those conferred by the French electorate. "As for legitimacy, I hold my legitimacy from the free election of the French people who have carried me where I am and before whom I alone am responsible."[53]

While de Gaulle concerned himself with France, Pompidou occupied himself with the average Frenchman. Pompidou was much more receptive to the point of view of others than was the General. He was accessible, open to persuasion, a good negotiator. De Gaulle had his head in the clouds; Pompidou had his feet planted firmly on the ground. The

following statement from a Pompidou press conference illustrates this point.

> "I'm not a historic personage. I represent no personal equation. I have my own style, my own manner, my own methods--and there's the difference. But in all essential matters I will not deviate an inch; all that counts is the independence of France, her role in Europe, and her position in the world. Little by little, day by day, I will see to it that she gets her proper share of things, without fanfare or drama. But I will see to it."[36]

Pompidou's goal in the conduct of foreign policy was continuity and substance and change in style. According to his biographer Philippe Alexandre, Pompidou defended the General's attitudes and priorities and instinctively followed his predecessor in matters of state. Pompidou's style cannot be totally divorced from the General's, though. His pragmatic approach to politics is strongly reminiscent of de Gaulle's, as evidenced by the following pronouncement. "Politics disgusts me. I have acquired a taste for it, because that is how one gets things done!"[37]

The de Gaulle-Pompidou relationship was one of mutual convenience. De Gaulle benefited as much from the services of his efficient lieutenant as Pompidou did from the General's patronage. Pompidou's biographer describes their relationship in the following terms. "De Gaulle made Pompidou master of requests, established him at the Matignon, made him appear on television, and will put him in the Elysée tomorrow, if it pleases him."[38] This account gives Pompidou little credit for his many talents. A more balanced, sober,

and realistic description of their division of labor appears later intthe work. "The General reserved four domains to himself: Algeria, which remained fiery, explosive; the constitution, foreign affairs, national defense. As for the rest, he placed his confidence in the man who was in his shadow, under his control."[39] Philippe Alexandre concurs in this appraisal, adding the "Pompidou had no connection with foreign affairs save insofar as they affected the nation's economy."[40]

Since most of Pompidou's publications were scholarly critiques of literature, it is difficult to discern his political world view in his writings. Unlike de Gaulle, he did not chronicle his role in world events. It is therefore necessary to analyze his speeches, press conferences, and public statements to understand the man. Though he sometimes served as a mouthpiece for de Gaulle, his speeches offer an insight to his own political philosophy.

Pompidou delivered an excellent summary of his world view in an address before the American Club in Paris on February 24, 1964. He depicted a new international world order, whose salient characteristics were the disappearance of a bipolar world, the emergence of a third world, and the development of fissures within the Communist bloc. He noted that France's role in this new order was a changing one.

> The important thing is that there were two masses and that there was in each a head, an uncontested and solitary head. Since that time the world has moved on, and we gradually saw the emergence of a third

> mass ... a third world, neutral or neutralist, it is said, whose principal concern is its own development, the effort to embark on industrial civilization and industrial prosperity. For this, it counts indiscriminately on the aid of one or the other bloc, at least of the one that wants to give this aid, and it fundamentally claims the right not to take sides. This is the first change.
>
> A second change came about when, within one of these groups, (I am referring to the Communist group) divergencies, shades of opinion began to appear ... We find ourselves in the presence of a Communist bloc which is at the very least cut in two; not, of course, that we should overestimate these divergencies and maintain that these countries will clash directly and violently, but henceforth they march separately and their policy is independent.
>
> And then, something has also happened within the Western bloc which is very different but nevertheless worthy of note: the countries of Europe ... have little by little regained their strength. And so the old division into somewhat monolithic groups is outmoded.[41]

This extemporaneous commentary demonstrates Pompidou's appreciation of the importance of the emerging non-aligned Third World, long before this term began to figure prominently in the vocabulary of western political analysts.

As might be expected, the philosophy of de Gaulle directly influenced Pompidou's interpretation of his country's role in this changing world order. The General considered the worldwide revolt against the bipolar system, which he called the "two hegemonies," to be the major phenomenon of our time.[42] Pompidou stressed the independent role of France which, like the Third World, should pursue a policy of non-alignment.

> France, member of the European Community and of the Atlantic Alliance, for this reason does not intend to perpetuate the policy of blocs ... We hope that relations between East and West might one day be normalized and founded, in spite of the differences between regimes, on respect for the rights of all and for the independence of everyone. Situated as she is geographically and supported by her historical traditions, France will be able to assume her own role in the necessary re-establishment of good relations at least on the day when the totalitarian world sincerely renounces any inclination to commit aggression.[43]

Ever the pragmatist, Pompidou considered the possibility of such a day only rhetorically. He was well aware of the role that the American nuclear umbrella played in the defense of Western Europe. He placed more credence in the deterrent value of the American nuclear arsenal than did de Gaulle. In his defense of the General's 1966 decision to withdraw from NATO, Pompidou argued that the organization itself could not prevent war and that only the American nuclear threat could deter the Soviet aggression.

> If there were to be a third great war in Europe, it would be nuclear and Europe would be destroyed ... but the nuclear weapon is not made to win war; it is made to prevent it. The aggressor's certainty that he would sustain unacceptable losses is the only guarantee that we can have against aggression ... That is what leads us to remain in the Atlantic Alliance. You think in terms of war, and of yesterday's war. We think in terms of deterrence, that is to say, of peace. Deterrence alone can guarantee peace, and for the West the only deterrence is nuclear. You tell us: NATO has guaranteed peace in Europe for fifteen years. What an error, if you are referring to the integrated organization! What has guaranteed peace is the alliance, insofar as it has brought to

> to bear the threat of the American Strategic Air Command ... It is atomic power, particularly American, also British and French, that is preserving it. You believe solely in integration, and that an alliance without integration is of no use, while only the nuclear weapons that are not integrated really count. You believe that the war can be won, while we can only hope to avert it by atomic deterrence.[44]

Disregarding the conventional military value of the NATO alliance and emphasizing the value of the American nuclear umbrella, Pompidou demonstrated a sound theoretical grasp of the concept of deterrence.

In his statements Georges Pompidou proved himself a well-informed, articulate, and persuasive speaker. He exhibited a knowledge of current events and theoretical concepts that often eluded his colleagues. His sharp mind absorbed ideas, assimilated them, and organized them into rational, coherent, convincing arguments. Pompidou worked at a faster pace than most men, easily sustaining a workload that quickly drained others. His intellect and capacity for work made him a habitual achiever and a formidable opponent.

Georges Pompidou was one of the rare individuals who succeeded at almost everything he tried. It was relatively easy to trace the experiences that combined to equip him so well for office. His early academic training contributed greatly to his success. Thoroughly schooled in the rigors of Cartesian logic and literary criticism, he applied this training in his defense of Gaullist policies before the National Assembly. His mastery of detail and of general theory was impressive.

His experience as an administrator, both under de Gaulle and with the Council of State led him to understand the machinations of the French political system. The image of the cool, methodical, plodding Pompidou emerged during the period 1944 to 1952. He cultivated a variety of valuable contacts and polished his interpersonal skills.

Pompidou's experience in the world of business proved equally valuable. He distinguished himself in the financial world as a director of one of France's most prestigious banks. The reputation he established in the private sector brought benefits in the form of contributions to de Gaulle's political campaigns during the early days of the Fifth Republic.

As a politician he drew upon all his previous training. His political future, nurtured and sanctioned by de Gaulle, seemed assured. Yet Pompidou's relationship with de Gaulle proved both his greatest asset and greatest liability. Of all conditions affecting his career, his association with de Gaulle had the greatest impact. Though a Gaullist in substance, he was not a Gaullist in style. The General preferred "man of the hour" situations: June 18, 1940, and May 13, 1958, are classic examples. He also loved dramatic exits: witness January 20, 1946, and April 27, 1969. Pompidou preferred continuity in his career to periods of self-imposed exile. While de Gaulle waited in the wings, Pompidou applied himself to new challenges. By his own admission, he was not a historic personage. De Gaulle preferred drama and high

visibility; Pompidou preferred calm and a low profile. De Gaulle negotiated publicly, often in the press; Pompidou excelled at behind-the-scenes bargaining. In matters of style, the two men were the antithesis of one another. In the Hegelian tradition, the thesis and antithesis of de Gaulle and Pompidou often merged to form a rational synthesis.

Whereas de Gaulle openly sought his niche in history, Pompidou was not always master of his own fate. He did not actively seek public office until he became premier at the age of 51. Both men emerged as national figures: de Gaulle be design, Pompidou more by circumstance.

There were two main differences between the foreign policies of de Gaulle and Pompidou. Pompidou subordinated foreign policy to domestic concerns, while emphasizing the importance of the Atlantic alliance and his Western European allies.[45] There were also several substantive changes under Pompidou, which included (1) moderated criticism of the United States, (2) enlarged ties with Europe and Britain, (3) emphasis of regionalism rather than globalism, (4) more multilateral diplomacy, using the talent and resources of the Quai d'Orsay, (5) limited use of the empty chair as a bargaining tool, (6) renewal of coalition politics in domestic and foreign policy, and (7) the notion that actions speak louder than words.[46]

The three objectives of Pompidou's foreign policy derived almost entirely from de Gaulle's: independence of the two hegemonies, enhancement of international prestige, and the extension and enlargement of French power. The Pompidou

style affected two areas primarily. A warning of relations with London resulted in Britain's admission to the Common Market in 1972 and renewed ties with Washington led to a stronger French participation in NATO. Pompidou's acknowledgment that the American nuclear umbrella was the cement of the NATO alliance differed from de Gaulle's stance. It showed a pragmatism and solidarity with allies that was uncharacteristic of his predecessor.

Conclusions

(1) Pompidou's experience in four areas (academic, administrative, financial, and political) molded his world view. An intellectual at heart, he combined his talents with great success. He did not possess de Gaulle's flair for the dramatic, nor did he consider himself a historic personage. His political style was more methodical and discrete than flamboyant.

(2) Pompidou's relationship with de Gaulle influenced his presidential style, which was often the antithesis of the General's.

(3) Support for Pompidou varied during his twenve years in office. His special relationship with de Gaulle ended in the summer of 1968. His relations with parliament changed from a vote of no-confidence in 1962 to a predominantly Gaullist legislature after his election in 1969.

(4) Pompidou continued the General's pursuit of independence, prestige, and power in foreign policy.

(5) Pompidou strengthened relations with the western allies, especially the United States and Great Britain. His

flexibility vis à vis such issues as France's role in NATO and Britain's admission to the EEC improved France's image in Washington and London. Because of his low profile, however, Pompidou remains an enigmatic personality to the foreign observer.

CHAPTER III

Giscard d'Estaing

It has been said that de Gaulle was a man of destiny, obsessed with the independence and grandeur of France. Pompidou was pragmatic, a manipulator and negotiator. It is difficult to characterize Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in such terms, for he brings a different set of qualifications to office than either of his predecessors.

One commentator has described Giscard as France's philosopher-president, and with good reason.[1] In 1977 Giscard published French Democracy, an interesting treatise on French modernization and its effect on his country and countrymen. Giscard argues his points in a crisp, clear style that vividly illustrates his intellectual capacities. In his book the French president proposes a four-point plan that includes a higher minimum wage, a more progressive system of taxation, decentralization of government, and a loosening of price controls.[2] These programs are designed to help alleviate some of the inequities of modern French society.

Ar article that appeared in the weekly newsmagazine l'Express during the presidential campaign of 1974 was entitled "Giscard Technocrat" and called him "the young man for whom everything has gone so well."[3] A graduate of France's

prestigious National School of Administration, Giscard rose rapidly through the ranks of the inspectorate of finance. Appointed minister of finance in 1962, Giscard was considered one of France's most promising young technocrats. One analyst has described France's young crop of technical experts as follows.

> A great number of ministerial posts were given to technicians. These men never held an electoral office but came from the administrative services that recruited from the elite schools of France--notably the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, established in 1946 ... They were above all technicians and managers, concerned with doing things, providing for services, establishing plans for economic development, running the public social and economic services. They were the "technocrats"--with an eye to efficiency and pragmatic choices, to statistics and economic charts. They were servants of the state rather than elected representatives of the people.[4]

A poll conducted in April 1974, one month before Giscard was elected to office, confirmed this public image. Respondents were asked to rank perceived strengths and weaknesses in the candidate's character. The public considered Giscard's technical competence as his greatest asset, followed by his ability to handle responsibility, his unquestioned integrity, his communications skills, and last of all, his Catholicism. The public perception of Giscard's weaknesses is perhaps more revealing. He was thought by many to be better acquainted with facts and figures than with human realities; some considered him a grand bourgeois; finally, he was perceived as a solitary man.[5]

A comparison of the relative strengths and weaknesses of Giscard and his challenger François Mitterrand gave Giscard a definite advantage. Frenchmen were asked which of the following traits applied to each candidate.[6]
(See table on page 69)

It is difficult to categorize Giscard the philosopher-intellectual-technocrat. Philippe Alexandre offers the following irreverent and entertaining description of France's current present.

> France, too, has her eggheads. Giscard d'Estaing, a disciple of Kennedy and Galbraith, is one of them. Reared in the expectation that he would one day become president of the republic, in 1962 at the age of 36, he was appointed minister of finance. He appeared to be on his way. But less than four years later he was dismissed from the past by Pompidou. D'Estaing struck back by criticizing the General, uttering his famous "Yes, but ..." After de Gaulle departed in 1969 he entertained the hope of becoming president, but his aspirations proved short-lived. Realizing he was still too young, he finally decided to support Pompidou. The new president rewarded Giscard by reinstalling him as minister of finance. Slender, elegant, and prematurely bald like so many brilliant intellectuals, he likes to ski and hunt wild game in Africa. His wife and daughts are all named after flowers.[7]

Giscard's World View

Few political leaders commit their philosophies to print while they are still in office. De Gaulle specialized in ex post facto analysis, preferring to chronicle his role in world events in the form of memoirs. Pompidou's publications consisted mainly of scholarly literary analyses. By contrast, Giscard published French Democracy after only three years in office. He sets forth his world view in this short

TABLE 2

GISCARD VS. MITTERRAND IN A PUBLIC OPINION POLL

Characteristic	Giscard	Mitterrand
Man of experience	85%	71%
Man of authority	73%	65%
Dynamic	79%	71%
Very cultivated	86%	66%
Honest	72%	51%
Sincere	65%	49%
Inspires Confidence	65%	42%

Source: l'Express 1189, 22-28 April 1974, p. 19.

but often eloquent work. In the opening pages he summarizes the effects of modernization of France, noting that France has changed more since 1950 than it did in the 80 years before mid-century. He cites the following statistics for the period 1950-1975: France's national product more than tripled in volume, and real consumption per capita nearly tripled; the infant mortality rate was reduced by 25 percent; a man's life expectancy increased by six years and a women's by eight; the amount spent on food declined by half, that spent on hygiene and health increased threefold; six times as many young people obtained their baccalaureates; the minimum old age pension increased threefold in real terms; and eight and a half million houses of apartments were built. He notes that in 1950, no one had a washing machine or television set; by 1975 seven out of ten had a television.[8] He fails to mention that in 1950, few people in the world owned a television set. Finally, he points out that in order to earn what they need to buy the same goods, Frenchmen have to work only half as long as they did twenty years ago.[9] The economist's penchant for figures and statistical trends is apparent in this description. Giscard's narration gives evidence of his technical background, of his insistence on precision and accuracy. In a later digression Giscard informs his readers that "the social sciences in France are insufficiently developed, and opinion about the facts is constantly preferred to knowledge of the facts themselves."[10]

In his discussion of French modernization Giscard compares the strength of the French economy to that of its neighbors, Great Britain and West Germany. He takes great pride in his nation's performance, maintaining that France is the world's third largest exporter, on a par with Japan, and that it has a gross national product 56 percent higher than Britain's.[11] Projecting these figures into the future, Giscard predicts that by 1985, France's industrial production should be comparable to West Germany's.[12]

Though Giscard is no Gaullist, he echoes many of the General's favorite themes in foreign policy, including competition with Britain, an utter contempt for Marxist ideology, and the reaffirmation of France's independence. It is noteworthy that Giscard's competition with Britain is economic, whereas de Gaulle's was political. Giscard's attack on Marxism is in much the same vein as his criticism of the social sciences in France; the technocrat in him rebels at the inconsistencies inherent in Marxist doctrine. "Marxism mystifies when it claims scientific status while ignoring the disciplines of science; when it attributes all oppression to economic power; when it reduces the history of nations to the class war; when it confers upon one particular class a messianic and redemptive role."[13] Finally, Giscard is as uncompromising as de Gaulle about French independence, which he defines as "the right to decide for ourselves, in the last resort, everything we consider essential for the French nation."[14]

Independence is not the essential ingredient of Giscard's foreign policy. He also stresses cooperation, a term quite foreign to de Gaulle's vocabulary. "Foreign policy," he writes, "will be based on the will to remain independent and the practice of solidarity and cooperation."[15] Here Giscard signals a departure from Gaullist doctrine in style as well as substance. "To assert its independence," he continues, "France does not need to be cantankerous. And when it practices cooperation France does not risk being diminished, for it has a vocation to cooperate."[16]

Giscard specifies three goals that France will pursue in its relations with European allies. His policy of cooperation and solidarity translates into the following concrete actions: the healing of relations with Germany, begun by de Gaulle and Adenauer; solidification of ties within the EEC; and the formation of a European Parliament.[17] As a former minister of finance, Giscard feels strongly about the economic unification of Europe.

> French democracy has clear ideas about the union of Europe. We shall not try to impose a detailed plan on others, but we intend to prevent Europe from dissolving into confused or impotent structures. First of all, economic and monetary union must be completed, according to the terms of the Treaty of Roem. It has to be admitted that this much-needed union is still a long way off. Our number one task is to make it a reality. Next we must make progress with the confederal machinery of the European union.[18]

In a final rather general summary Giscard outlines his view of France's international role. Like Pompidou before him he admits that the world is still dominated by

competition between the superpowers and conflict among the nations belonging to the main alliances. He stresses that France will continue to pursue a policy of détente in its relations with the superpowers. He singles out the independent states of Africa as an area of special interest to France, indicating that France will continue to give them financial support as well as other types of aid. In a departure from Gaullist doctrine, he notes that France will cooperate ratherthan confront in relations with its allies. In conclusion he acknowledges the interdependence of the nations of the world, stating that the solution to economic problems and security issues cannot be found at a national or regional level, but only at a world level.[19]

Historical Summary

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was born in 1926 of a distinguished family of civil servants who for centuries have combined careers in finance with public service.[20] He enlisted in the French army in 1944 and saw his first action at the age of eighteen against SS units in the Danube region. After the war he enrolled in the National School of Administration and graduated at the top of his class. In 1952 he joined the inspectorate of finance and served in a variety of capacities during the next ten years.

After de Gaulle appointed Giscard minister of finance in 1962 the young man embarked upon a deflationary program of austerity to cool down France's economy. Giscard's outspoken manner did little to endear him to the aging General, however. When de Gaulle dismissed Giscard from his

government in 1965, he formed his own party, the Independent Republicans. Shortly after Pompidou's victory in the presidential campaign of 1969 he re-appointed Giscard minister of finance. When Pompidou died in April 1974, the forty-eight-year-old Giscard skirmished with established members of the Gaullist coalition for leadership of the right. His opponents included Edgar Faure and Pierre Messmer, both relics of the Gaullist old guard, and Jacques Chaban-Delmas. Giscard and Chaban-Delmas represented the right on the first ballot of the presidential election held May 5, 1974.

François Mitterrand, the Socialist leader and candidate of the left won 43.24 percent of the votes on the first ballot. Giscard followed with 32.60 percent of votes cast, and Chaban-Delmas brought up the rear with 15.10 percent.[21] During the critical two-week period before the run-off election Mitterrand and Giscard courted uncommitted members of the pivotal center-left parties, particularly the Unified Socialists and Radicals. Mitterrand was counting heavily on the dissolution of the center vote and its defection to the left.

Though Mitterrand gained support from the center, he did not gain enough to win. Giscard suffered losses from the same quarter but not enough to lose.[22] In the left's best performance since de Gaulle came to power, Mitterrand received 11,882,926 votes or 49.20 percent of votes cast.[23] Giscard received 50.80 percent of votes on the second ballot, defeating his challenger by a margin of less than 400,000 votes.[24]

A composite analysis of the electorate showed that Giscard's supporters were predominantly older, female, and rural; Mitterrand's were younger, male, and urban.[25] Giscard's support was also conservative and in many cases non-Gaullist, as a poll of his political constituency revealed. A survey conducted by Nouvelles Littéraires indicated that 53 percent of Giscard's voters held a positive view of Marshal Pétain, leader of the collaborationist Vichy regime.[26]

Addressing the French public immediately after the election, Giscard announced, "I understood during this campaign that you wanted change, social and political change. You won't be disappointed. I will bring about change, with your help."[27] Once in office, Giscard sponsored legislation to lower the voting age to eighteen, to legalize abortion, and to liberalize France's strict divorce statutes. His government increased the minimum wage and retirement benefits, offered asylum to political exiles, suppressed wiretapping, and curtailed arms sales to undemocratic regimes.

In 1978 Giscard's cabinet consisted of thirty-six posts, the largest ever in the Fifth Republic. Only fifteen were ministers-with-portfolio, however. The other twenty-one were secretary-of-state positions for such diverse areas as foreign labor, university affairs, penitentiaries, and adult education. There were three women in the cabinet, two of whom were ministers. Six cabinet members were graduates of the National School of Administration, three were from the Institute of Political Studies, and four were former civil

servants. Giscard has drawn heavily from among his fellow technocrats. Though some cabinet members were in their early forties, most were in their fifties like Giscard. A majority of Giscard's ministers were centrists; only one-third were Gaullists.[28]

In the finest tradition of de Gaulle, Giscard has made unilateral policy decisions without consulting his cabinet. In 1974 he anounced his intention to conduct underground nuclear tests. When Giscard ignored Jean-Jacques Servan-Schrieber's criticism of his decision, the leader of France's Radical party resigned from the cabinet in protest.[29] Françoise Giroud, secretary-of-state for women's affairs, left the government in disgust after Giscard repeatedly discounted her recommendations. The former editor of l'Express has written an account of her experiences entitled The Comedy of Government.

Giscard's party does not enjoy a majority in the National Assembly. In 1975 his governing coalition included 185 Gaullists and 110 centrists, mostly Independent Republicans.[30] The Communist-Socialist alliance of the left mounted one of the greatest challenges to Giscard's rule during the legislative elections of March 1978. The two parties agreed on a platform known as the "Common Program" in 1972 and public opinion polls conducted before the 1978 elections favored the alliance to win.[31] The legislative elections of 1978 were as hotly contested as the presidential contest four years earlier. There was a record 85 percent turnout for the run-off election. The Union for French Democracy, organized by

Giscard's supporters in the closing days of the campaign, won 137 seats and emerged as the second largest party (behind the Gaullists) in the National Assembly. The Gaullists lost support, returning 148 of an original 170 deputies to parliament.[32] In all, the Gaullists and the Union for French Democracy captured 285 of parliament's 490 seats, a clear majority.

The election was not the overwhelming victory for the left that the pollsters had predicted. Voters who supported the left on the first ballot defected to the right on the second. Raymond Aron, who describes the French intelligentsia as "the most intelligent and the most unreasonable in the world" notes that many vote their convictions on the first ballot and their pocketbooks on the second.[33] Practical considerations outstrip ideological ones in the end. The election did prove that the united left is a political force to take into account. De Gaulle had always maintained that there were two poles in the French political spectrum: the Gaullists and the Communists. André Malraux went so far as to say that "between the Communists and us there is nothing."[34] After the 1978 election Giscard's advisors admitted that one of de Gaulle's greatest errors had been to accentuate this polarization. The dominance of the extreme right and the extreme left in French politics has become a thing of the past. Giscard seems to prefer it that way. He has stated that his dream is to end the polarization of French politics. The 1978 election proved that there are four main parties in the French political spectrum rather than two. The Independent

Republicans won almost as many seats in the National Assembly as the Gaullists, and the Socialists commanded more vote than the Communists for the first time since World War II.[35]

As a politician Giscard has shown considerable talent for deflecting the criticism his opponents direct toward his government. He has insulated himself from direct scrutiny by letting his prime minister act as a political lightning rod. When his first premier, the Gaullist Jacques Chirac, resigned in August 1976 Giscard named Raymond Barre as his successor. Giscard introduced Barre to the French public as "France's best economist," citing his credentials as a professor of economics at the Sorbonne. The president promised voters that Barre would remedy inflation and improve the economic situation in time for the 1978 elections. This political move protected Giscard from the criticism of Chirac's Gaullists and the left, prompting political pundits to call Barre "Giscard's life-jacket" and "presidential battleship."[36]

Barre is well acquainted with the politics of confrontation. Two decades ago he represented France before the Common Market Commission, where his criticisms of American monetary and trade policies won high mark from de Gaulle. He also served as minister of foreign trade in Chirac's cabinet. Responding to an American warning against Communist participation in Western European governments in 1978, Barre replied in typical Gaullist fashion, "France does not have to take advice or lessons from anyone."[37]

Barre has enjoyed a certain degree of success at his appointed task. His anti-inflationary measures reduced France's inflation rate by three percentage points in time for the 1978 election. He has also helped cement relations between Paris and Washington.[38] Giscard's tactic of letting Barre act as "lightning rod" for general discontent cost him some popularity in the polls. A survey conducted by the conservative newspaper Le Figaro showed that the favorable rating of Giscard's performance in office slipped from 62 percent in January 1979 to 54 percent in July to a mere 49 percent in September. Barre's likewise fell from 36 percent in July 1979 to 29 percent in September. When compared to Jimmy Carter's rating of 19 percent approval in September 1979, Giscard's low of 49 percent does not seem so abysmal. Also, compared to the fortunes of the Gaullists, who were seriously contemplating a change in leadership in September 1979, Giscard was riding high.

Giscard's timely appointment of Premier Raymond Barre helped salvage the domestic and international situatio for the president. Above all, his narrow margins of victory in 1974 and 1978 indicate that he is a survivor.

Giscard's Foreign Policy

Giscard is a political realist, as evidenced by his criticism of President's Carter's human right policies, but he does not advocate a return to Cold War relations between East and West. His main objection to Carter's human rights stand was that it had compromised the process

of détente.[39] In a July 1977 interview he described détente as the only reasonable alternative to an escalating arms race between Moscow and Washington.

> I don't believe that détente is a ruse to lull the West into a false sense of security while they achieve global military supremacy and later world domination. In my judgment, Moscow's détente objectives are limited and specific. Firstly, a slowdown and then a reduction in the nuclear arms race on the basis of parity. Mr. Brezhnev is wondering whether one of the U.S. objectives isn't to recapture a measure of military technological superiority. Secondly, the recognition that there are very real and specific areas for developing economic, political, and cultural cooperation outside the ideological competition.
>
> Détente is an alternative to a senseless arms race. Détente is an option on the opposite course that is designed to avoid confrontation and maintain rough parity in armaments, while attempting to collaborate, without forsaking our respective convictions that one side's system is superior to the other.[40]

Giscard aired these opinions shortly after Brezhnev's state visit to Paris in June 1977, which focused upon the issue of détente.[41] The French government reconsidered its position after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Though the French initially took a milk view of the invasion, they later modified their stance. Eleven days after the news became public, Giscard signed a joint statement with German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt condemning the Soviet move, then proceeded to soften his statement in the course of background briefings for domestic consumption. He seemed reluctant to condemn the Soviet action or to endorse it.[42]

Giscard refused to support an American initiative to impose sanctions against the Soviets during the spring of 1980. When France opposed a meeting of European leaders in Bonn, the United States scuttled the plan. Instead, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance made a fast-paced visit to several European capitals. Cherishing its special relationship with Moscow, France had once again distanced itself from an American position.[43] French Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet remarked early in the crisis that "France is not America's barnyard."[44] Giscard issued an angry statement criticizing American efforts to coordinate allied sanctions against the Soviets that signalled to Moscow his reluctance to line up behind Washington. In a later press conference, he commented:

> I'm surprised at the insistence of certain people to push us--unsuccessfully, by the way--toward alignment with the ideas of this one or that one, that is to say, the reconstitution of the system of blocs that increase tension on one hand and on the other eliminate the margin for maneuver and influence of France's foreign policy ... Any meeting that would result in a bloc approach to the current situation will not win French participation.

An American mission dispatched to enlist the support of European leaders was rebuffed in Paris, primarily because it had arrived uninvited. The Americans had the effrontery to visit Paris with their initiative in hand, rather than submitting it in advance through channels for French endorsement. Because France had not been consulted beforehand (shades of de Gaulle), it would not be party to any sanctions agreement. Giscard sought to balance France between East and West by refusing to take sides in the dispute.

Asked what de Gaulle would have done in such a crisis, Maurice Couve de Murville, the General's foreign minister of many years replied, "A country that is a member of an alliance cannot say that it is non-aligned. It is a contradiction in terms. France should follow its own policy. It should not offer its good offices between the superpowers."[46] Giscard admitted that his policy was too complicated for the American public to understand. A member of his staff remarked to a reporter, "To the average American, it undoubtedly looks contradictory to say that we are your allies and we have our own independent foreign policy."[47]

Like any successful politician, Giscard is an opportunist. His willingness to exploit a temporary advantage has resulted in strengthening of ties with the Common Market, NATO, and France's former colonial possessions in Africa. Giscard's vision of an expanded Common Market with more Mediterranean members has not always been popular with his countrymen. He has expressed a commitment to membership for Greece and Spain, partly to support the democratic governments that have replaced military regimes there. His support for Portuguese membership is less vocal. Almost all the French parties, led by the Gaullists, have opposed the Spanish and Greek applications. They fear that these countries will flood the French market with surplus wine and produce, undercutting prices.[48] This feeling is particularly strong in the Midi region, where French farmers annually converge on the provincial capital of Montpellier to protest the influx of inexpensive foreign wines into the local market.

Giscard has shelved his plans for expanding the EEC in the face of domestic opposition. He remains committed to the principle of strengthening Europe through such organizations as the European Parliament and the Common Market, however.

> Despite all the doom and gloom, another important point has been the agreement on European elections for a European Assembly by universal suffrage. Over 100 million Europeans will go to the polls on the same day in nine countries to cast their ballots in a gesture of continental dimension. Cassandras notwithstanding, this decision was taken by France and Britain at the same time. Those who say this does not strengthen the European Executive (of the Common Market) cannot see the forest for the trees. In a world of crisis and turmoil, Europe is still moving forward. I get very irritated by these constant plaintive whimpers on the sad fate of Europe.[49]

Recent events suggest that France may be considering rejoining the NATO alliance.[50] The thirteen-member defense grouping would certainly benefit from such a move, which would increase NATO strength in Europe by half a million troops, more than 1,000 tanks, and some 500 aircraft.

The European argument in favor of France's return to the fold is persuasive. Deployment of French ground forces would relieve the 500,000-man West German army of its singular responsibility for the defense of the corridor separating Europe from the Warsaw Pact. The only countries with any sizable troop presence in the forward positions are Britain (55,000) and the United States (225,000). Since the United States abolished the military draft in 1974, reserves

are so depleted that it is unlikely the United States could muster any immediate ground support in case of a Soviet conventional assault on West Germany. Soviet military planners are currently uncertain how France would react if West Germany were attacked, but a firm commitment from France would settle the issue and strengthen the alliance. In summary, French power is needed to fill the void created by waning American influence and general apathy among smaller members of the alliance. Such a commitment would also improve NATO's overall effectiveness and morale as a European combat unit.

The French argument against the move is equally compelling. What has France to gain from such an arrangement? If American influence in the region is indeed evaporating, this only serves to justify de Gaulle's decision of fifteen years ago. The General was correct in questioning the American commitment to the defense of Western Europe. Besides, how could France's independent nuclear strike force be integrated into the NATO command structure? Furthermore, French troops would never agree to follow the command of Americans, who still dominate the upper echelons of the organization. As the world's third most powerful nation militarily, France has everything to lose and nothing to gain by rejoining NATO, Finally, and most important, the French argue, it is not NATO but the American nuclear deterrent that prevents Soviet aggression. Premier Pompidou articulated this conviction on April 21, 1966, when he defended de Gaulle's decision to withdraw from NATO before the National Assembly.

> You tell us: NATO has guaranteed peace in Europe for fifteen years. What an error, if you are referring to the integrated organization! What has guaranteed peace is the alliance, insofar as it has brought to bear the threat of the American Strategic Air Command ... It is atomic power, primarily American, also British and French, that is preserving it.[51]

Professor Roy C. Macridis has described France's military strategy as "how to have the alliance and the bomb."[52] French military planners, according to his theory, envision the NATO alliance as a first line of defense against aggression from the East, while the nuclear strike force serves as a weapon of last resort. In a typical scenario, NATO and French forces would defend Western Europe in conventional battle. If it became apparent that the aggressor intended to invade and occupy France, the French government would alert the enemy that it was willing to retaliate with nuclear weapons. This critical threshold of aggressiveness is the key to the situation. Having issued a warning, the French government would then consider itself free to employ the nuclear strike force independently on NATO, regardless of whether NATO ground forces were still engaged in battle.

Obviously, this scenario contradicts the spirit and intention of the NATO alliance. The nuclear strike force isolates France from its allies, since it cannot be integrated into the NATO command structure. According to Macridis, the basic problem is France's intransigence in the face of any form of integration--be it political or military.

Though avoiding military integration with his NATO allies, Giscard has agreed to define the circumstances under which the nuclear strike force would be employed against an aggressor. This is reassuring to the NATO allies, who were stunned in November 1968 when de Gaulle's chief of staff, General Ailleret, announced France's all-horizons defense plan.[53] This plan anticipated enemies on all sides, and stated France's intention to oppose the aggressor from whatever quarter he came.[54] In short, France's nuclear strike force was poised to strike in all directions.[55] Under Pompidou, the army was reorganized in a manner that emphasized the primacy of the nuclear weapon--with improved delivery capabilities and the development of some four nuclear submarines with missiles.[56] Pompidou decreased overall defense spending, however: in 1970, for the first time in the Fifth Republic, expenditure for education and research exceeded that for national defense.[57] Under Giscard, a spirit of cooperation and consultation with the NATO alliance appears to have replaced the Gaullist tradition of confrontation with allies. Giscard is resigned to the reality of Europe's dependence on the United States for its ultimate defense.[58]

France's activites in Africa indicate an increased awareness of its role as a member of the western alliance. In April 1977 Giscard convinced King Hassan II of Morocco to dispatch 1,500 troops to the aid of Zairian President Mobutu's embattled army in the mineral-rich Shaba province. France provided transports and technical advisers for the airlift. The Moroccans helped turn the tide against the

Katangan invaders, who were reportedly supported by Cuban advisors from Angola. King Hassan II afterward maintained that

> Charles de Gaulle never would have abandoned Africa's French-speaking countries. This policy (military support for former French colonies) was shelved under Pompidou but is now being revived under Giscard. High time, too. Nothing succeeds like success.[59]

Hassan appears to have a selective memory. Pompidou in fact re-opened official relations with Morocco on December 15, 1969, after de Gaulle had severed them. At that time Hassan II said "I did not acede to de Gaulle. I have no reason to do so before Pompidou."[60]

Giscard won the applause of both Zaire and the U.S. Department of State for his African venture. In May 1978 the Katangan rebels launched a similar invasion, this time aimed at the copper-mining town of Kolwezi. Giscard responded by airlifting 600 paratroopers of France's crack Foreign Legion in conjunction with Belgian forces. The Legionnaires did most of the fighting in and around Kolwezi, precipitating a massive withdrawal by the invaders. Giscard evacuated the Legionnaires shortly after their successful mission. Again he won the approbation of the United States and the Western allies, with the exception of the Belgians, former colonial masters of the region. Concerning his decision to intervene in Zaire, Giscard commented: "I came to the conclusion that the U.S. and Europe were absent in Africa at a very crucial moment and that it was necessary to act on our own to preserve the security and territorial integrity of a western-

oriented state--which, by definition, means the protection of western interest."[61]

Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev sent Giscard what Soviet sources described as a sharp message after the Kolwezi operation. Giscard replied with public criticisms of Soviet violations of human rights. The tension eased only after the foreign ministry's African affairs director, Guy Gregory, visited Moscow to explain the French action. According to one source, he pointed out that France was in Africa to defend its interests there and that the French had no intention of becoming America's Cubans in Africa.[62]

Having proved that they can be useful in performing missions that the Americans are in no position to undertake, the French have become serious foreign policy partners of the United States in Africa. One commentator has noted that "unlike de Gaulle, who always seemed to leave American officials wondering if his cooperation, when it did occur, was not a prelude to finding a new way to tweak Uncle Sam's beard, Giscard has gone out of his way to act as a loyal partner. When he opposes the United States, he always seems to convey the message that he is being a loyal opponent, and opposes Washington only on a specific issue."[63]

De Gaulle established a reputation as a protector of moderate African governments by intervening militarily in black Africa three times in his eleven years in power. In the year between May 1977 and May 1978, Giscard committed French forces on five fronts in Africa and the Middle East.[64]

Giscard's extension of French power to the continent of Africa is a rather unique aspect of French foreign policy in the Fifth Republic.

Giscard began improving his ability to operate in Africa shortly after he assumed office in 1974. With General Guy Mery, army chief of staff, he fashioned an elite corps of 20,000 lightly-armed troops that could be airlifted to Africa on eight hours' notice to fight brush-fire wars and engage in counterinsurgency operations. Giscard can deploy his quick-reaction forces almost at will. In the finest tradition of de Gaulle, he ordered the paratroop jump on Kolwezi after only perfunctorily consulting his cabinet and ignoring parliament.[65]

France's interests in Africa justify Giscard's activities there. Among the most ardent advocates of the French presence are Morocco's King Hassan II, Senegal's President Leopold Senghor and the Ivory Coast's President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. There are 55,000 French citizens in Morocco, 40,000 in the Ivory Coast, and 24,000 in Senegal, with all the economic interests their presence implies.[66] The French also have lucrative economic ties to Muammar Kaddafi's Libya. There are 2,400 Frenchmen working in Libya. During the 1970's France sold 164 Mirage jets, twelve warships, and uncounted helicopters to the Kaddafi regime. The Peugeot-Citroën automobile firm has contracted to sell 30,000 cars in Libya this year. Several French firms have negotiated defense contracts there as well.[67] In May 1978 the Ivory Coast's Felix Houphouet-Boigny reiterated

his country's dependence on France: "We count on the support of France. We have complexes about that ... There is no reason that France, faithful to its traditions, should not honor its commitments toward us, that is to say, to come to our aid if we should be attacked."[68] Giscard has said that he favors Africans themselves being responsible for security in Africa: "We should have an Africa Corps made up of Africans," he remarked.[69]

Giscard has practical reasons for the growing French military presence in Africa. The troops there help protect France's interest in raw materials, including copper in Zaïre and uranium in Chad. He has reaped political benefits from his show of power in Africa: his popularity increased dramatically after the airlift of Moroccan troops to Zaïre in April 1977. Giscard's African policy also fills a void left by the United States when the American Congress voted to end military aid to the UNITA rebels in Angola in December 1976. Although French officials admit to nothing, it is widely assumed that France is supplying arms and ammunition to the UNITA guerrillas of southern Angola, who continue to battle the ruling MPLA faction and the Cubans there.[70] In June 1978 French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud described the French effort to fill the void as follows: "It is probable that the weakening or the disappearance of a certain kind of American presence in the world today encouraged the Soviets to profit in these various situations of tension. What we are trying to do above all is help the Africans themselves take control of their problems."[71]

Giscard described the process as pre-empting a vacuum: "In Africa, I think it is more a matter of targets of opportunity than a grand plan. When a vacuum is created, as was the case in Angola, the Soviets fill it. The same thing has happened in Ethiopia. But when the vacuum was pre-empted by others, they did not persist."[72]

The 10,000 French troops stationed in Africa in 1978 constituted a foreign force second only to Cuba's 40,000. They were spread across the continent in small units. (See table on page 92.)[74]

In addition to its African contingency, France maintained 1,200 U.N. peace-keeping troops in Lebanon. In February 1980 the French had the largest permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean of all the western allies, with four heavily armed frigates and a command ship based at Djibouti, plus eight transport vessels, destroyers, and patrol ships operating from La Reunion Island.[74] These forces together comprised the largest French military presence abroad since the end of the Algerian war in 1962.[75]

In December 1977 Senegal's President Leopold Senghor provided France its most important base in black Africa. Giscard established a tactical wing of ten Jaguar jets at a base near Dakar. In May 1978 fighting broke out between Morocco and Mauritania over the Spanish Sahara, which both sides claimed. France's ten Jaguar jets flew air strikes to protect underpopulated Mauritania against incursions by the Algerian-backed and Soviet-armed Polisario guerrillas fighting

TABLE 3

FRENCH TROOPS IN AFRICA UNDER GISCARD (1978)

Country	Commitment
Chad	1,400 troops
Djibouti	4,500 troops
Gabon	550 troops and advisers
Ivory Coast	550 troops and advisers
Mauritania	100 troops
Senegal	1,200 troops
Zaïre	700 troops
Total	9,000 troops and advisers

Source: Newsweek, 5 June 1978, pp. 59 and 61.

for control of the Spanish Sahara. The Jaguars killed dozens of guerrillas in an attack on a convoy in Mauritania early in May, and continued to fly reconnaissance and harassment missions throughout the campaign.[76]

Other French missions in 1978 included protecting Chad's government from Libyan-backed guerrillas. French forces particpated as U.N. peace-keepers in the former French mandate of Lebanon that year and three French soldiers died in the fighting. Some 4,000 French troops were still stationed in Djibouti a year after it was granted independence in July 1977. One of France's three aircraft carriers continues to patrol the waters off the Horn of Africa to protect French oil routes there.[77]

France withdrew 1,500 troops from Chad in 1980, reducing its total commitment in Africa to approximately 8,000. These forces are roughly divided among Djibouti (4,000), the Central African Republic (1,270), Senegal (1,000), Gabon (800), and the Ivory Coast (800).[78]

Another aspect of Giscard's foreign policy that bears a striking similarity to his strengthening of ties with the EEC, NATO, and French Africa is his special relationship with Germany. Giscard and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt enjoy a personal friendship that is reminiscent of de Gaulle's reconciliation with Konrad Adenauer two decades ago. The Franco-German Friendship Treaty of 1963 established semi-annual meetings between the two heads of state. Over the past decade Schmidt and Giscard both former finance ministers,

have met dozens of other times. Officials in Bonn describe their relationship as relaxed. A French aid noted that the two men have great esteem for one another and that they have confidence in each other's intellect. Giscard's relaxed style has been an asset in his dealings with Schmidt, who is often moody and impatient. Giscard has kept his advice to the chancellor private, knowing Schmidt does not appreciate being lectured in public. The two speak frequently by phone, usually in English, though they understand each other's language. Schmidt once told an assembled delegation that he and Giscard spend a lot of time discussing history, comparing their peoples' common problems, and drawing conclusions from them.[79]

Their special relationship has translated into concrete policies, particularly in the realm of European integration. Aside from the proposed monetary union, the two leaders have collaborated on such issues as direct election of a European Parliament and expansion of the Common Market to include Spain, Greece, and Portugal. "Giscard has a much clearer concept of the vital elements of our relationship," said a German official. "His policy is to avoid unnecessary friction and not to confront the U.S. That has eliminated a major problem for us."[80]

Despite the French emphasis on the Third World, Giscard has made a special effort to cultivate good relations with the Germans. Keeping Paris and Bonn together during the opening phase of the Afghanistan crisis proved especially difficult. Giscard is aware that together Germany and France

are the world's third power--economically, militarily, and politically.[81]

Giscard does not discount the threat that the Warsaw Pact poses to France and Germany. In a May 25, 1978 address before the U.N. General Assembly's special session on disarmament he stressed the need to find a way to reduce the Warsaw Pact's superiority over NATO in conventional weapons. For example, he noted that the Warsaw Pact has three times as many tanks as NATO. He called for a new European security conference that would seek to negotiate a balanced reduction in the enormous arsenals of conventional weapons possessed by the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. In the course of his address he unveiled several ambitious arms control proposals. The French president suggested the creation of a new international agency that would monitor arms agreements through the use of satellites, and called for the establishment of a world institute for disarmament studies.[82]

Giscard is willing to recognize France's status as a medium power in the modern world. "The Elysée takes the view," according to one observer, "that all of de Gaulle's pretensions to great-power status are finished, but that we need to show that we are a medium power that has the means and the willingness to make itself respected."[83] Speaking at a special press conference on foreign affairs in February 1979, Giscard suggested the creation of a medium-power triangle. He proposed a summit conference of Western Europe, African,

and Arab leaders, clearly excluding the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.[84]

One analyst suggests that Giscard's foreign policy is dedicated to ending France's isolation from NATO, the Mediterranean, and the United States. In particular Giscard is wholly committed, as he states in French Democracy, to the notion of European union and the establishment of a functional parliament in Strasbourg. Giscard has abandoned several key elements of Gaullist foreign policy. He is less inclined than his predecessors to balance France between the United States and the Soviet Union, or to alternately undermine the policies of Washington and Moscow. He is more concerned with the creation of a united Europe than with the formation of an independent Europe under the leadership of France. Finally, he appears to view the nuclear strike force as a credible nuclear deterrent within the confines of the Atlantic alliance rather than independent of it. Nostalgia for the past has given way to exploring the opportunities of the present. Cooperation has replaced confrontation as the watchword of French foreign policy.[85]

Conclusions

(1) Giscard's experiences as a technocrat and civil servant molded his world view. Like Pompidou before him he is an intellectual. Unlike his predecessors, he governs by coalition rather than by majority. His often slim margin of victory demonstrates his political shrewdness and ability to survive.

(2) The death of Pompidou catapulted Giscard into the national consciousness. He is an opportunist who has exploited other situations (particularly in Africa) to the fullest.
(3) Support for Giscard within the French electorate is predominantly conservative, rural, and female. He has successfully deflected challenges from both the alliance to the left and the Gaullists, contributing to the formation of a new centrist force in French politics.
(4) Giscard has abandoned the politics of grandeur in an effort to establish France as a medium power. He still jealously guards France's independence in foreign policy, especially in the matter of its nuclear strike force.
(5) Giscard's style is distinctly European. He has tried to promote regional integration through French participation in the EEC, NATO, and the European Parliament. He has strengthened ties with the United States and Britain. His low-key, relaxed style has placed France on cordial terms with its allies for the first time since de Gaulle came to power in 1958. Westerners are comfortable with Giscard's emphasis on cooperation instead of confrontation. Americans see in the French president a kindred spirit rather than a scheming antagonist.

CHAPTER IV

Conclusion

Chapter One established five general criteria and three specific issues by which to compare the leaders of the Fifth Republic. The following tables seek to characterize each president in the eight individual categories.

(1) Experiences	: De Gaulle was the soldier-statesman; Pompidou was the administrator-intellectual; Giscard is the technocrat-philosopher.
(2) Conditions	: De Gaulle's presidency was born of the Algerian crisis; Pompidou's presidency grew from his close relationship with de Gaulle; Giscard's presidency resulted from Pompidou's death.
(3) Support	: De Gaulle was originally supported by the people in a series of plebiscites and later by a Gaullist majority in the National Assembly; Pompidou was originally supported by de Gaulle and later by a Gaullist majority in the National Assembly; Giscard was originally supported by conservative, rural, and female voters and later by a Centrist coalition in the National Assembly.

(3) Opposition	: De Gaulle was originally opposed by the National Assembly, which he dissolved after a vote of no-confidence in 1962, and later resigned after receiving a negative vote in the plebiscite of 1969; Pompidou received a vote of no-confidence as Premier in 1962 and was later dismissed by de Gaulle in 1968; Giscard was dismissed by de Gaulle in 1965, was opposed by leftist, urban, and male voters in 1974, and was challenged by the Communists, Socialists, and Gaullists in 1978.
(4) Goals	: De Gaulle was obsessed with power, prestige, and independence; Pompidou continued to pursue the General's objectives of power, prestige, and independence; Giscard prefers medium power, respect and independence.
(5) Style	: De Gaulle was a confrontational, unpredictable egotist; Pompidou was a pragmatic, methodical, negotiator; Giscard is a cooperative, opportunistic survivor.
(6) EEC	: De Gaulle sought to limit the Common Market to the Six and exclude Great Britain from membership; Pompidou preferred to expand the Common Market to nine members and admit Britain; Giscard seeks to further expand the Common Market to twelve members, including Spain, Greece, and Portugal.
(7) NATO	: De Gaulle withdrew France from NATO in 1966 and stressed the development of his independent nuclear strike force; Pompidou maintained France's distance from NATO and at the same time de-emphasized the importance of the nuclear strike force;

		Giscard has steered France back toward the alliance and has defined the terms under which he would consider using the nuclear strike force.
(8) East-West Relations	:	De Gaulle balanced France between the superpowers, favoring neither, and supported French Africa; Pompidou engaged in summitry, emphasizing the nonaligned Third World, and supported French Africa; Giscard opposed the policy of blocs, favoring the establishment of a medium power triangle, and has intervened actively in French Africa.

A poll conducted in France in 1967 asked the following question: "Which features of French foreign policy, if any, are likely to persist after de Gaulle?" Thirty-four percent of respondents foresaw a continuation of uncooperative French policies toward the United States and NATO. Twenty-seven percent predicted a continuation of the Franco-German rapprochement. Fifteen percent anticipated a continuation of de Gaulle's policies in the Mideast. Only twelve percent expected a continuation of the General's policies toward the non-Western countries, particularly Southeast Asia and China. In short, the respondents expected that the Gaullist style of somewhat prickly and self-assertive diplomacy might be modified in relatively marginal matters, but would persist in substance.[1]

Events have not borne out this expectation. French foreign policy since de Gaulle has changed in both style and substance. Pompidou's foreign policy differed from de Gaulle's in several basic respects, not the least of which was the emphasis placed on nuclear weapons. Pompidou tended to

discount the role of the nuclear strike force in the international arena, while de Gaulle paraded it before the world. A second major difference was that while de Gaulle's world view was global, Pompidou's was regional. De Gaulle's reach quite often exceeded his grasp,[2] but Pompidou's vision rarely extended beyond Europe, the Meditteranean, and North Africa. He considered it more important for France to be able to respond rapidly to challenges within its immediate sphere of influence than to involve itself in protracted wars of attrition as in Indochina and Algeria.[3]

One major area of similarity between de Gaulle and Pompidou was their opposition to the SALT negotiations and to arms limitation treaties in general. Both men felt that SALT was an affront to the independence of France, a treaty carefully calculated by the superpowers to exclude the rest of the world. De Gaulle and Pompidou regularly practiced the politics of the empty chair at nuclear disarmament conferences.[4] The French often refused to attend disarmament conferences on the grounds that they were intended to reinforce nuclear monopoly among those states that already possessed nuclear weapons. They boycotted talks on mutual balanced force reductions between the United States and the Soviet Union on the grounds that any accommodation reached between the superpowers would weaken the defense of Western Europe. They refused to participate in the SALT talks for the same reason.[5]

Under Pompidou France's arms sales abroad soared. In 1970 France replaced Britain as the world's third largest arms exporter, behind the United States and the Soviet Union. The success of the Mirage fighter-bomber during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war sparked particular interest in French armaments among buyers in the Mideast.[6]

Pompidou focused his political gas inward, toward France and Frenchmen; de Gaulle looked outward, toward the world and affairs of state. One analyst has noted that "as much by default as by desire, the Pompidou government focused on strengthening its domestic political base and on encouraging closer economic and political cooperation with its European partners rather than on promoting rapid changes on defense questions at home and abroad."[7]

Giscard has also differed from de Gaulle on key issues, particularly France's participation in the EEC and the NATO alliance. Although Giscard publicly follows official Gaullist doctrine that France will never rejoin the military part of the Atlantic alliance, French cooperation behind the scenes in NATO is very broad nowadays.[8]

Giscard is no Gaullist. He came to power with the image of a friend of the United States rather than a Gaullist-style adversary. This change in style is Giscard's most salient contrast with his predecessors.[9]

Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing have all left their personal mark on French foreign policy during the past 23 years. Each president had a unique style that determined the flavor of his country's

activities aborad, and that reflected in the conduct of France's foreign affairs. As long as de Gaulle's Fifth Republic endures, its presidents will continue to mold France's foreign policies to their own personalities. It is this aspect of French foreign policy that makes it such an intriguing topic to the student of international relations.

NOTES

Introduction

[1]Although the National Assembly voted de Gaulle into power on June 1, 1958, he did not possess legal executive authority until his election to office on December 21, 1958.

[2]Henry W. Ehrman, Politics in France (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), p. 354.

[3]Charles de Gaulle, "The need for a strong state," Speech delivered at Bayeux, June 16, 1946.

[4]Roy Pierce, French Politics and Political Institutions (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 21. There is a distinction in French between external policy and foreign policy. The former applied to all the colonies, including Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Vietnam. Since these colonies were part of France, they were not handled by the foreign ministry. Foreign policy applied only to foreign governments. This study makes no such distinction and includes colonial policy within the purview of foreign policy.

[5]Charles de Gaulle, "The need for a strong state," Speech delivered at Bayeux, June 16, 1946.

[6]Alfred Grosser, French Foreign Policy under de Gaulle (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965) p. 31.

[7]Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, Three Essays (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969) p. 15.

[8]Grosser, p. 24; W. W. Kulski, De Gaulle and the World (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966) p. 7.

[9]Kulski, p. 38.

[10]Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972) p. 27.

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[12]Ibid.

[13]Arthur S. Banks, ed., Political Handbook of the World: 1977 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977), p. 125.

[14]Michael Getler, "NATO: Will France Come Back?" The Washington Post, September 1979.

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[16]"Various French Polls in Accord on One Thing: Giscard Slipping." International Herald Tribune, 2 February 1981, p. 5.

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[4]Ibid., p. 128.

[5]Charles de Gaulle, The Army of the Future (Philadelphia, J. P. Lippincott Company, 1941), pp. 8-9.

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[9]Ibid., p. 128

[10]Ibid.

[11]Lacouture, p. 184.

[12]Roy Pierce, French Politics and Political Institutions (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 51.

[13]Roy C. Macridis, French Politics in Transition: The Years After de Gaulle (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1975), pp. 13-14.

[14]Edward A. Kolodziej, French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 461.

[15]Guy de Carmoy, The Foreign Policies of France (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 251, 466.

[16]Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs (New York: Simon and Scuster, 1972), p. 83.

[17]Kolodziej, pp. 458-459.

[18]"To France With Love," Newsweek, 14 November 1977, p. 67.

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[20]Macridis, p. 39; "Epic Terror," Newsweek, 22 May 1978, p. 92.

[21]Kolodziej, pp. 115-117.

[22]Macridis, p. 49.

[23]Kolodziej, pp. 129-131.

[24]Lacouture, p. 190.

[25]Macridis, p. 21.

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[28]de Gramont, p. 178.

[29]Kolodziej, p. 101.

[30]Ibid., pp. 104-105; Macridis, p. 22.

[31]Deutsch, p. 37.

[32]Kolodziej, p. 342.

[33]Ibid., p. 315

[34]Alexandre, p. 107.

[35]Kolodziej, p. 342.

[36]Ibid., p. 377.

[37]Ibid., p. 380.

[38]Macridis, pp. 22, 41.

[39]Kolodziej, p. 241.

[40]Ibid., p. 247.

[41]Ibid., p. 242.

[42]Ibid., p. 251.

[43]Ibid., p. 336.

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[47]Kulski, p. 60.

[48]Banks, ed., p. 123.

[49]Alexandre, p. 309.

[50]Malraux.

[51]Kolodziej, p. 430.

[52]Ibid., p. 243, Macridis, p. 69.

[53]Deutsch, p. 14.

[54]Lacouture, p. 184.

[55]Ibid.

[56]Kolodziej, pp. 236-241.

[57]Ibid., pp. 241-242.

[58]Michel Andréani, interview held in Montpellier, France, 2 May 1975.

[59]de Carmoy, p. 468.

[60]Kolodziej.

[61]Lacouture, p. 189.

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[5]Ibid., p. 141.

[6]Ibid ., p. 158.

[7]Ibid, p. 240.

[8]Kolodziej, p. 400; Macridis, p. 27.

[9]Alexandre, p. 3.

[10]Macridis, p. 51

[11]Ibid., p. 96.

[12]de Gramont, p. 235.

[13]Macridis, p. 31.

[14]Ibid., p. 37.

[15]de Gramont, p. 324.

[16]Kolodziej, p. 439.

[17]Macridis, p. 41.

[18]Kolodziej, p. 401.

[19]Ibid, p. 407, Macridis, pp. 42-43.

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[21]Kolodziej, p. 433, Macridis, p. 43.

[22]Macridis, p. 50.

[23]Kolodziej, pp. 437-438.

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[25]Kolodziej, pp. 504-505.

[26]Ibid, p. 537.

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[33]Macridis, p. 96.

[34]Bromberger, p. 10.

[35]Kolodziej, pp. 429-430.

[36]Alexandre, pp. 2-3.

[37]Bromberger, p. 10.

[38]Ibid., p. 8.

[39]Ibid., p. 155.

[40]Alexandre, p. 106.

[41]Kulski, p. 19.

[42]Ibid., p. 22.

[43]L'Année Politique 1962, p. 695. Pompidou's address before the National Assembly, 13 December 1962.

[44]Kulski, p. 101.

[45]Kolodziej, pp. 582-583.

[46]Ibid., pp. 584-585.

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[2]Joseph Kraft, "Giscard's Opportunity," The Washington Post, 21 March 1978, p. A17.

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[12]Ibid., p. 85.

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[14]Ibid., p. 114.

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[18]Ibid., p. 116.

[19]Ibid., pp. 116-118.

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[21]Macridis, p. 101.

[22]Ibid., p. 120.

[23]Ibid., p. 101.

[24]Ibid., p. 120.

[25]Ibid., p. 121.

[26]Ronald Koven, "France Deeply Split over Soviet Actions," The Washington Post, 23 February 1980, p. A22.

[27]"Giscard: Cent Jours pour tout changer," L' Express 1193, 20-26 May 1974, p. 15.

[28]Macridis, pp. 135-136.

[29]Ibid., p. 135.

[30]Ibid., p. 131.

[31]Jim Hoagland, "Socialists Half Policy Talks with Communists in France," The Washington Post, 16 September 1977, p. A18.

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[40]Ibid., pp. 45 and 46.

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[78]"Giscard's Sound and Fury," Newsweek, 26 January 1981, p. 40.

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